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STILLBORN PROTECTION AGAINST INSURERS' BAD





Both Illinois and California have strongly worded, specific statutes
aimed at controlling unfair insurance practices. California has developed
a sophisticated and effective method for private enforcement of the pro-
hibited practices; Illinois has not. This article reviews Illinois law in light
of California decisions, and determines that there is a pattern by which
to predict the development of bad faith insurance law in Illinois. While
the Illinois appellate courts have been active in this area, the Illinois
Supreme Court has issued only one decision.' This article compares Illinois
appellate decisions with California decisions, and focuses on the effect
that Illinois Insurance Code section 7672 has on the recovery of punitive
damages and the causes of action that are potentially successful.
I. A PRIVATE REMEDY FOR AN INSURER'S VIOLATION
OF ITS STATUTORY DUTY
A. The llinois and California Unfair Practices Acts
Illinois' Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts
and Practices Act' and California's Unfair Claims Settlement Practices
* William M. Shernoff, B.B.A., University of Miami; J.D., University of Wisconsin. The
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firm of Shernoff & Levine, Claremont, California.
Marian Haycock Tully, B.A., Chico State University; J.D., University of San Diego. Ms.
Tully is an associate with the law firm of Shernoff & Levine, Claremont, California.
The authors wish to thank their law clerk, Diane Archer, third year law student at Western
State University College of Law, for her valuable assistance with the preparation of this article.
I. Conway v. Country Cas. Ins. Co., 92 Ill. 2d 388, 442 N.E.2d 245 (1982). Conway is
the only Supreme Court opinion concerning bad faith decided in Illinois in ten years. Conway
was not a landmark decision and addressed only two narrow issues:
whether the insurer's payment to the extent of the liability limits of its policy to
the claimant discharges its duty under the policy to defend its insured in the personal
injury action; if not, whether the insured can recover the amount he pays in excess
of the liability limits of the policy to settle a suit by the claimant; and, if the
insurer's duty to defend is part of the damages awarded.
Id. at 393, 442 N.E.2d at 246. When the court decided Conway, the intermediate appellate
courts were split on several much broader questions.
2. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1983).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1028-1041 (1985).
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Act 4 are based on model legislation drafted by the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners, entitled "An Act Relating to Unfair Methods
of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the
Business of Insurance" (Model Act).'
The Model Act was amended in 1972 to include fourteen different unfair
claims settlement practices. 6 California and Illinois adopted most of the
model provisions. Both states added to the Model Act; however, Illinois
has, literally, a more far-reaching statute than California.
Section 790.03(h) of the California Insurance Code7 lists thirteen pro-
hibited practices from the Model Act. The California Code also prohibits
insurers from "directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of
an attorney,'"' and from "misleading a claimant as to the applicable
statute of limitations. ' 9 Section 766.6 of the Illinois Insurance Code,
"Acts constituting improper claims practices," 0 did not adopt two sections
from the Model Act that California adopted. These two sections prohibit:
Making known to insureds or claimants a policy of appealing from
arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of
compelling them to accept settlements or compromises less than the
amount awarded in arbitration; and
Failing to promptly settle claims, where liability has become reasonably
clear, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to
influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy cov-
erage."
However, the Illinois Insurance Code includes sections that prohibit:
Engaging in activity which results in a disproportionate number of
meritorious complaints against the insurer received by the insurance
department;
Engaging in activity which results in a disproportionate number of
lawsuits to be filed against the insurer or its insured by claimants;
Failing to provide forms necessary to present claims promptly and with
such explanations as are necessary to use them effectively.' 2
These provisions impose broader duties than those described in the Cali-
fornia Insurance Code. Illinois also has a "catch-all" provision that
prohibits "[e]ngaging in other acts which are in substance equivalent to
any of the foregoing."' 3
4. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1986).
5. Model Unfair Ins. Pract. Act §§ 6-7 (National Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs 1972).
6. Id.
7. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1986).
8. Id. § 790.03(h)(14).
9. Id. § 790.03(h)(I5).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 766.6 (1983).
II. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790.03(h)(10), (12) (West Supp. 1986).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 766.6(f), (g), (o) (1983).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 766.6(p).
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Both Illinois and California authorize a remedy for unfair practices"
through the state insurance commissioner.'" The effectiveness of this rem-
edy in the overall control of unfair practices is doubtful. 6 Consequently,
many states have adopted some form of private enforcement.' 7 Neither
the California nor the Illinois Act expressly authorizes a private remedy.
The California Supreme Court, however, recognizes a private cause of
action available to both insureds 8 and third-party claimants' 9 against
insurers for conduct prohibited by the California Unfair Practices Act.
The Illinois Supreme Court has not decided whether there is a cause of
action for violation of its Unfair Practices Act. The Illinois appellate
courts have refused to recognize a civil remedy available to either an
insured or a third-party claimant for the insurer's violation of the Act.20
B. The California Interpretation
California courts permit an insured to sue an insurance carrier, not only
for breach of the insurance contract, 2' but also for violations of the Unfair
Practices Act.2 2 Since the Act governs the insurance industry for the benefit
of citizens affected by unfair practices, California also permits a claimant
who is not a named insured to bring an action against an insurance
carrier. 23 To further encourage compliance with the act, California permits
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages from an insurance carrier
that knowingly commits an unfair practice or commits a general business
practice in violation of the Act. 24
14. The claims practices described and prohibited by the Model Act, with the additional
prohibited practices of each state, will generally be referred to as unfair practices. The statutes
will generally be referred to as the Unfair Practices Acts.
15. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790.04-790.10 (West 1972); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 766.7-766.8
(1983).
16. W. SHERNOFF, S. GAGE, & H. LEVINE, INsuRAcE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 6.04 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as SHERNOFFl.
17. Id. at § 6.04(2)(a). See also S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILrTY AND DAMAGES §
9.03 (1984) (discusses private causes of action under various states' unfair claims settlement
practices statutes).
18. Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470
(1973).
19. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr.
842 (1979).
20. See Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156 (2d Dist. 1980);
Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74 111. App. 3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718 (lst Dist. 1979). Accord
Langendorf v. Travelers State Ins. Co., 625 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. III. 1985).
21. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 819, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482, 487 (1979).
22. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 886, 592 P.2d 329, 333, 153
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In Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,25 a California inter-
mediate appellate court recognized that an insured has a civil remedy for
violation of the California Unfair Practices Act. In Greenberg, the plain-
tiffs sought damages in a class action for the insurance company's alleged
unfair practice of requiring a home loan borrower to purchase whole life
insurance at a fixed rate. The court found that this "tie-in" agreement
violated §790.03(c), 26 which prohibits "unreasonable restraint of, or mo-
nopoly in, the business of insurance." ' 27 The court held:
While the Insurance Code in sections 790.04 through 790.08 provides
for administrative enforcement of statutes governing insurance compa-
nies, including section 790.03, Insurance Code section 790.09 states in
pertinent part: "No order to cease and desist issued under this article
directed to any person ... shall in any way relieve or absolve such
person from any civil liability . . . ." Section 790.09 thus contemplates
a private suit to impose civil liability irrespective of governmental action
against the insurer for violation of a provision of the Insurance Code.
The fair construction is that the person to whom the civil liability runs
may enforce it by an appropriate action. 2
The separate nature of the civil remedy was reinforced in Shernoff v.
Superior Court. 29 In the lower court, the plaintiffs sought damages in a
class action suit against title insurers, alleging a conspiracy to fix title
insurance rates. The court ordered a stay intended to allow the insurance
commissioner to investigate the plaintiffs' allegations. The appellate court
found that since the insurance commissioner's disciplinary authority was
limited to restraint of future illegal conduct, the plaintiffs' civil remedy
for damages from past acts was not precluded.3 0 The District Court of
Appeal issued a writ of mandate to dissolve the stay order.
The California Supreme Court followed the reasoning of both Greenberg3
and Shernoffl2 in its landmark decision in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v.
Superior Court.3" The effect of Royal Globe has been felt nationwide.34
25. 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973).
26. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(c) (West 1972).
27. Id. The section prohibits "[elntering into any agreement to commit, or by any concerted
action committing, any act of boycott, coercion or intimidation resulting in or tending to result
in unreasonable restraint of, or monopoly in, the business of insurance."
28. Greenberg. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 1000-01, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE
§ 790.09 (West 1972)).
29. 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975).
30. "No rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies precludes processing of a civil claim
without resort to an administrative procedure which is irrelevant to the claim." Id. at 410, 118
Cal. Rptr. at 682 (quoting Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 1000-01, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475).
31. 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973).
32. 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975).
33. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979). The court reasoned that prior
cases allowing private causes of action under § 790 should be followed to allow a private
litigant to bring suit under § 790.09.
34. See SHERNOFF, supra note 16.
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The plaintiff in Royal Globe filed an action for personal injuries incurred
in a fall at a grocery. She joined the market's liability carrier, Royal
Globe Insurance Company, and an independent adjuster, Robert E. Hunt
Company, as defendants. The plaintiff sued for violations of subdivisions
(h)(5) and (h)(14) of the Unfair Practices Act, specifically for "[n]ot
attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement
of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear, [and] . .. [d]irectly
advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney." ' , Royal
Globe held that a private litigant has standing to bring a civil action for
violation of the Unfair Practices Act.36 The court looked first to the
language of the Act:
Section 790.09 provides that a cease and desist order issued by the
Commissioner under the provisions of the act shall not absolve an
insurer from "civil liability or a criminal penalty under the laws of this
state arising out of the methods, acts or practices found unfair or
deceptive." This provision appears to afford to private litigants a cause
of action against insurers which commit the unfair acts or practices
defined in subdivision (h).'
Civil liability under the Act accrues to both insureds and third-party
claimants. "[A]n examination of the language of subdivision (h) demon-
strates that it was intended to prohibit unfair settlement practices by
insurers directed against both claimants and insureds." 3 The California
Supreme Court clearly recognized that claims practice regulation is de-
signed to protect those affected by unfair practices. For example, the
35. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5), (14) (West Supp. 1986).
36. 23 Cal. 3d at 886, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
37. Id. at 885, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (emphasis in original). The court
emphasized that § 790.09 differed from the Model Act, which provides that an insurer shall
not be absolved of liability under any "other" state laws. The California statute omits the
word "other." The California Supreme Court reasoned that this omission indicated the legis-
lature's intent that civil liability on the part of the insurer would arise not only from other
laws of the state, but also from the Unfair Practices Act itself. Id.
38. Id. at 888, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847. To clarify its analysis, Royal Globe
distinguished a California appellate court ruling in Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d
937, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976). In that case, the court held that a third-party
claimant who had recovered a judgment against the insured for an amount in excess of the
policy limits could not sue an insurer for breach of the duty to settle without an assignment
of the insured's cause of action. Id. The theory of recovery in Murphy was based on "contractual
principles" and not statutory violations. In Royal Globe, the court stated:
In the present case, the plaintiff does not seek to rely upon the violation of the
insurer's duty to its insured to settle plaintiff's claim. Rather, she relies upon the
insurer's duty owed to her as a claimant under subdivisions (h)(5) and (h)(14) of §
790.03, a duty created by the statutory provisions and owed directly to plaintiff as
a claimant.
23 Cal. 3d at 890, 542 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
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Department of Insurance investigates complaints from both insureds and
third parties as part of its enforcement powers under the Act.39
Royal Globe also clarified the type of conduct that leads to statutory
liability. The court rejected the defendant's argument that an action must
be "committed with such frequency as to indicate a general business
practice." ' 40 The statute prohibits "knowingly committing or performing
with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice,'" any of
a number of unfair claims settlement practices. The court followed a
suggestion by the California Trial Lawyers Association in an amicus curiae
brief:
[Tlhe language quoted provides for two alternative methods by which
the prohibited acts may be shown, i.e., a violation of the subdivision
occurs if the prohibited acts are knowingly committed on one occasion
or, if knowledge cannot be established, then it will suffice if the acts
were performed with such frequency as to indicate a general business
practice.42
The statute itemizes unfair practices in both the singular and the plural.
43
For example, subdivision (h)(5) proscribes misleading "a claimant as to
the applicable statute of limitations.'" The California Supreme Court
concluded that if a third-party claimant may sue an insurer under the
statute, "it is inconceivable that the Legislature intended that such a
litigant would be required to show that the insurer committed the acts
prohibited by that provision 'with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice." '' 45 The court concluded:
[T]o an aggrieved private litigant who can demonstrate that the insurer
acted deliberately, the frequency of the insurer's misconduct and its
application to others is irrelevant. Although the language of the statute
is not clear, if the premise is accepted that a private party may bring
an action for an insurer's violation of subdivision (h) under the rationale
of Greenberg and Shernoff, then a single violation knowingly committed
is a sufficient basis for such an action.46
39. See Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 889, 542 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848. The court
noted that the California Department of Insurance interpreted § 790.03(h) broadly enough to
allow such private claims.
40. Id. at 890, 542 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
41. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1986).
42. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 890, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
43. See CAL. IN s. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1986).
44. Id. at § 790.03(h)(5). This provision is one under which the Royal Globe plaintiff sued.
45. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 891, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849 (quoting CAL.
INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1986)).
46. Id. at 891, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849. The court ordered the trial court to
enter judgment on the defendant's demurrer because the plaintiff had attempted to join both
the insurer and the insured in the same lawsuit. The court held that an action against an insurer
must be "concluded" before a bad faith action could arise. What constitutes a conclusion for
the purpose of a Royal Globe suit is still in conflict in the California appellate courts. See
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C. The Illinois Interpretation
Unlike California, Illinois recognizes no cause of action for violation
of the Unfair Practices Act to third-party claimants and severely limits
actions brought by first-party insureds. 7 Illinois courts specifically reject
the California analysis.
In Scroggins v. Allstate Insurance Co., 4s the plaintiff sued Allstate for
"wrongful refusal to negotiate in good faith with plaintiffs, as claimants
against Allstate's insureds. ' 49 The Circuit Court of Cook County dismissed
the allegation, and the First District Appellate Court affirmed. The ap-
pellate court held that "[bjecause the duty, though implied in law, arises
out of the insurance contract relationship . . . it is clear that the duty is
owed to the insured .... ."0 The duty of good faith and fair dealing "is
one which the insurer owes to its insured, not to third parties." ' , Scroggins
held that a third-party claimant has no standing to sue absent the insured's
assignment of his cause of action against the insured.52
Scroggins looked to the Illinois Unfair Practices Act and found that
even under the statute, an insurer's duty runs only to its insureds." The
Afuso v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 859, 215 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1985); Williams
v. Transport Indem. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 953, 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1984); Rodriguez v.
Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 46, 190 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1983).
47. See Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 85 III. App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156 (2d Dist. 1980);
Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718 (Ist Dist. 1979).
48. 74 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718 (ist Dist. 1979).
49. Id. at 1029, 393 N.E.2d at 719. The underlying case involved an automobile collision.
50. Id. at 1030, 393 N.E.2d. at 720 (citations omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. But see SHERNOFF, supra note 16, at § 6.28:
In view of the general inadequacy of most administrative enforcement mechanisms
to prevent statutory violations and the fact that such remedies provide no relief for
the injured policyholder or claimant, the better view is that the insured or third
party claimant should be permitted to maintain a private action for damages caused
by such violations.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 766.5-766.6 (1983), provide:
Section 766.5. Improper claims practices.
It is an improper claims practice for any domestic, foreign, or alien company
transacting business in this state to commit any of the acts contained in section
[766.6] if:
(a) It is committed knowingly in violation of this act or any rules promulgated
hereunder; or
(b) It has been committed with such frequency to indicate a persistent tendency to
engage in that type of conduct.
Section 766.6. Acts constituting improper claims practices. Any of the following
acts by a company, if committed without just cause and in violation of section
[766.61, constitutes an improper claims practice:
(d) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement
of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear.
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court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish themselves as members of
the "class of persons the statute is designed to protect." 5 Although a
similar contention had persuaded the California courts, Scroggins rejected
the argument that a rule, promulgated by the Director of Insurance under
the Unfair Practices Act, requiring insurance companies to "affirm or
deny liability on first or third party claims within a reasonable time""
demonstrated that the statute was designed to protect third-party claim-
ants. The court stated:
While we agree that the statute and rule are apparently intended to
cover third party as well as first party claims, plaintiffs' argument fails
to recognize that the insurer's duty has always run to its insured in
either context.16
Scroggins relied on the California decision in Murphy v. Allstate Insurance
Co.," instead of Royal Globe." "The same court [which decided Royal
Globe] unanimously held that the insurer's duty to settle runs to the
insured and not to third party claimants." 5 9 Scroggins cited another Cal-
ifornia appellate decision, which stated in dicta that "it would be 'rather
a startling proposition' to hold that a statutory enactment of the duty to
settle somehow extended to third party claimants." '60 Reliance on Murphy
v. Allstate Insurance Co. 6 1 for this principle is unsound, because that case
was not decided under the Unfair Practices Act; it was decided under a
breach of contract theory. 62
Although the Unfair Practices Act states that an insurer owes a duty to
the third-party claimant, Illinois provides no civil remedy for the violation
of this duty. 63 To reach this conclusion, notwithstanding the plain words
of the Act, Scroggins read one portion of the Act very narrowly. 64 The
Model Act and the act adopted by Illinois clearly apply to regulating the
industry and not simply to governing the contract between the policyholder
and the insurance company.61
54. Scroggins, 74 III. App. 3d at 1034, 393 N.E.2d at 723.
55. Id. at 1034, 393 N.E.2d at 723 (emphasis in original).
56. Id.
57. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
58. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
59. Scroggins, 74 III. App. 3d at 1036, 393 N.E.2d at 724 (emphasis in original).
60. Id. (quoting Scheuch v. Western World Ins. Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 31, 145 Cal. Rptr.
294 (1978)).
61. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
62. Id. at 944, 553 P.2d at 588-89, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 428. See supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
63. Scroggins, 74 111. App. 3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718 (Ist Dist. 1979).
64. The Scroggins court distinguished Royal Globe in part because of the Illinois Act's
retention of the word "other": "[tlhe only comparable provision in our Insurance Code
preserves 'other' and addresses itself only to 'liability under any other laws of this state."' Id.
at 1036, 393 N.E.2d at 724 (emphasis in original). See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
65. However, in Stamps v. Caldwell, 133 III. App. 2d 524, 273 N.E.2d 489 (1971), a third-
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Scroggins noted that Royal Globe was a four-to-three decision, and
cited Justice Richardson's dissent: "[If] the legislature had intended to
change the course of [the] law 180 [degrees], and thereafter to impose
upon carriers civil liability to injured third persons for failing to settle
claims against their insured, then surely much more direct and precise
language would have been selected."" Scroggins never directly confronted
the rationale of the Royal Globe majority opinion. Scroggins flatly stated
that although both the California and Illinois Acts list unfair practices
which refer to both insureds and third-party claimants, the duty of the
insurer runs only to the insured. 67 This reasoning overlooks the fact that
few insureds will sue an insurer for breach of a statutory provision that
relates to the claimant, thereby leaving third-party claimants without a
remedy for an insurer's unfair practices.
Additionally, Illinois provides no civil remedy for a breach of statutory
duties to insureds. 68 However, since there is clearly a direct duty to
insureds, the courts must rely on a different rationale to support this
result. At least two districts have found that the Illinois Department of
Insurance is the exclusive means to remedy violations of the Code. 69
party claimant was denied attorney fees under § 767 in an action against an insurer to collect
a judgment against its insured. The court stated that:
[slection 17671 of the Illinois Insurance Code .. . is designed to protect insured
parties who are forced to expend attorney fees where the insurer refuses to pay
under the terms of the policy . . . and where such action on the part of the insurer
was vexatious and without reasonable cause. The statute does not extend to third
parties, such as plaintiff, and plaintiff cites no case law in support of his position.
Id. (citing Keepes v. Doctors Convalescent Center, Inc., 89 Il1. App. 2d 36, 231 N.E.2d 274
(1967)). But see SHERNOFF, supra note 16, at § 6.04(2)(cXi).
66. Scroggins, 74 Ill. App. 3d at 1036, 393 N.E.2d at 724 (Ist Dist. 1979) (quoting Royal
Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 896, 592 P.2d at 339, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 853).
67. Id. at 1034, 393 N.E.2d at 723. But see McCarter v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
130 Il1. App. 3d 97, 473 N.E.2d 1015 (3d Dist. 1985), where the Third District Appellate Court
held that an insurer's duty may run to third parties under special circumstances. In McCarter,
both the injured third party and the negligent party in an automobile and motorcycle accident
were insured by State Farm. State Farm allegedly "advised the plaintiff that he did not need
to be represented during settlement negotiations and that [State Farm] would settle the plaintiff's
claim ... fairly and equitably because both vehicles were insured by [State Farm)." Id. at 101,
473 N.E.2d at 1018.
The McCarter court distinguished Scroggins' holding that "an insurance company's duty to
negotiate in good faith is owed only to its insured and not to third parties." Id. The court
held that "since State Farm had promised to represent and protect the interests of both the
injured third party and the insured, it owed a duty of good faith to both parties." Id.
68. Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 631, 635, 407 N.E.2d 156, 159 (2d Dist.
1980).
69. Tobolt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 71, 393 N.E.2d 1171, 1181 (Ist Dist.
1979) (§ 766.6 of the Code was merely "a definition section" which "provides no remedy");
Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 56 I1. App. 3d Il1, 115-16, 371 N.E.2d 373, 377 (3d
Dist. 1978) (Insurance Code allows a private litigant to bring an action against an insurer for
attorney fees only for withheld policy benefits or when the insurer's refusal to pay is "unrea-
sonable and vexatious").
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In Hoffman v. Allstate Insurance Co.,7" the Illinois Second District
Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of a complaint that sought damages
for Allstate's violation of Illinois Insurance Code section 766.6. 7 Allstate
towed Hoffman's car to an "unknown location"72 after it was damaged
in an accident. Allstate's adjuster stated that Allstate considered the car
a total loss and tendered a check to plaintiff in full payment of the claim.
Included in the calculation for the check total was a $55.00 deduction for
"dealer preparation and shampoo." 71 When asked why this deduction was
made on a "totalled" car, the adjuster said, "Allstate always does that. '74
Allstate also refused to inform Hoffman of the location of the car, which
prevented him from having it appraised. The court held:
Plaintiff's reliance on paragraph 766.6 is unfounded. Paragraph 766.6
merely provides a list of acts which constitute improper claims practices.
Paragraph 766.7 provides that penalties for violations of paragraph
766.6 are to be determined by the State Director of Insurance ....
Furthermore, in Tobolt v. Allstate Insurance Co., the First District
recently stated that paragraph 766.6 is merely a definition section which
provides no remedies. Such remedies are provided in paragraph 767.".
Hoffman was followed by the First District Appellate Court in Hamilton
v. Safeway Insurance Co.76 The court affirmed the dismissal of a class
action on behalf of all insureds allegedly entitled to uninsured motorist
or hit and run benefits under insurance policies issued by Safeway. The
complaint listed thirteen improper claims practices engaged in by Safeway
that were prohibited by section 766.6. 77 The court held that section 766.6
merely defined improper acts and provided no remedy. The plaintiffs'
only available recovery was the money damages listed in section 767 for
which the plaintiffs made no claim.78 "In enacting section [767], the
Legislature preempted the field of remedies available to an insured who
has difficulties with an unreasonable and vexatious insurance company." 9
The court relied on Brooks v. Midas International Corp.,'0 reasoning
that since the legislature had provided a remedy through the Director of
Insurance, no civil remedy was available. Brooks had found that the
70. 85 Ill. App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156 (2d Dist. 1980).
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 766.6 (1983).
72. Hoffman, 85 Ill. App. 3d at 633, 407 N.E.2d at 157.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 635, 407 N.E.2d at 159.
76. 104 III. App. 3d 353, 432 N.E.2d 996 (Ist Dist. 1982) (the First District, Fourth Division
decided Hamilton; the First District, First Division decided Tobolt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 III.
App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (1st Dist. 1979)).
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 766.6 (1983).
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1983).
79. Hamilton, 104 111. App. 3d 353, 355-57, 432 N.E.2d 996, 998-99 (Ist Dist. 1982).
80. 47 III. App. 3d 266, 361 N.E.2d 815 (Ist Dist. 1977).
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legislative intent precluded a private suit for injunctive relief under the
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act. The Hamilton court
stated, "[Tihe Legislature, had it intended to grant a private right of
action for injunctive relief, would have explicitly done so . . . ."8 Ham-
ilton, however, contradicts the Illinois Supreme Court case of Sawyer
Realty Group v. Jarvis, 2 which was decided only two days earlier. 3
Sawyer held that the plaintiffs had an implied private right of action
under the Real Estate Brokers and Salesman Licensing Act.
It is clear that it is not necessary to show a special legislative intent to
create a private right of action. If there is no indication that the remedies
available are only those the Legislature expressed in the act, then where
it is consistent with the underlying purpose of the act and necessary to
achieve the aim of the legislation, a private right of action can be
implied.-
Sawyer also found that the administrative remedy provided by the
legislature does not preclude a private remedy. 5
We agree with the plaintiffs' assertion that the maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius-the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
another thing-is only an aid and "should not be used to defeat the
apparent intention of the Legislature." Because the Legislature provided
for departmental enforcement does not necessarily mean that they must
not have intended a private right of action.'"
The First District Appellate Court8 7 found Sawyer inapplicable to section
767 in Kinney v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co.8" The plaintiffs in Kinney
alleged that snow had damaged their home in the amount of $10,000.00.
81. Hamilton, 104 Il. App. 3d at 355-56, 432 N.E.2d at 999 (quoting Brooks v. Midas
Int'l Corp., 47 Ill. App. 3d 266, 277, 361 N.E.2d 815, 822 (Ist Dist. 1977)).
82. 89 Ill. 2d 379, 432 N.E.2d 849 (1982).
83. Sawyer Realty Group v. Jarvis was decided on February 2, 1982, and Hamilton was
decided on February 4, 1982.
In Langendorf v. Travelers State Ins. Co., 625 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Ill. 1985), the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois distinguished Sawyer on the flimsy basis that
the Sawyer holding implies a private right of action only where necessary to achieve the aims
of the statute. The Langendorf court said the aims of § 766.6 were adequately achieved through
§ 766.8, which empowers the Director of Insurance to issue a cease and desist order against
the insurer that committed an act prohibited by § 766.6. The court felt it was irrelevant that
the Director of Insurance had never brought such an order since the statute was enacted.
Langendorf, 625 F. Supp. at 1106.
84. 89 Ill. 2d at 386, 432 N.E.2d at 852 (citing Kelsay v. Motorola, 74 Il. 2d 172, 384
N.E.2d 353 (1978)).
85. 89 Ill. 2d at 391, 432 N.E.2d at 854. Similarly, the California Supreme Court has found
a private remedy for violation of the Unfair Practices Act, which expressly authorizes an
administrative remedy through the Department of Insurance.
86. Id.
87. Tobolt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (Ist Dist. 1979), was
decided by the same court.
88. 120 Ill. App. 3d 294, 458 N.E.2d 79 (Ist Dist. 1983).
402 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:391
The defendants' adjuster wrote an estimate of $3,950.70, but surrepti-
tiously informed plaintiffs' contractor that his actual estimate was $9,500.00.
The adjuster refused to accept the contractor's offer to repair the damage
at that price. The defendants proposed $5,000 as their final offer in
complete settlement of the claim. The plaintiffs sued for compensatory
damages for breach of contract, and compensatory and punitive damages
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Sawyer had effectively over-
ruled Hamilton89 and Hamilton's predecessors.90
ITihe enactment involved in the case at bar differs from and is com-
pletely removed from the Brokers Licensing Act. The Brokers Licensing
Act did not expressly deal with or consider allowance of damages for
violation of the Act. The Legislature anticipated such general actions
might well be brought. The fact that the Brokers Act did not expressly
create a "private right of action for compensatory damages under any
section of the Act [did not indicate] that the General Assembly rejected
such a remedy . . . ." On the contrary, the Insurance Code provides
explicitly for allowance of damages to private individuals resulting from
violation of that Code and then places strong and express limitations
on the amount of damages which may be recovered. 9'
This superficial reasoning ignores the underlying issue. Section 767 does
not provide a private cause of action, but merely provides a remedy of
attorney fees and an additional limited amount of damages where an
insurer has acted vexatiously or unreasonably.9 2 Even if section 767 limits
a plaintiff's damages, the private cause of action still exists. The court
also failed to consider that section 767 is not part of the Unfair Practices
Act; it merely follows the Act." It seems logical that in determining
whether the legislature had intended to provide a private remedy under
the Unfair Practices Act, the court would consider the language of the
Act. The Act itself provides an administrative remedy through the Director
of Insurance.9 4 Although the Brokers Licensing Act provided an admin-
istrative remedy, Sawyer insisted that "[b]ecause the Legislature provided
for departmental enforcement does not necessarily mean that they must
not have intended to create a private right of action."9
Kinney also ignored the policy reasons articulated in Sawyer:
89. 104 Ill. App. 3d 353, 432 N.E.2d 996 (Ist Dist. 1982).
90. Hoffman, 85 II. App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156 (2d Dist. 1980); Tobolt v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (Ist Dist. 1979); Urfer v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 60
Ill. App. 3d 469, 376 N.E.2d 1073 (4th Dist. 1978); Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 56
Ill. App. 3d III, 371 N.E.2d 373 (3d Dist. 1978).
91. Kinney, 120 111. App. 3d at 298-99, 458 N.E.2d at 82-83 (citations omitted).
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1983).
93. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
94. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 766.7-766.8 (1983).
95. Sawyer, 89 111. 2d at 391, 432 N.E.2d at 854.
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The public policy underlying certain statutes demands implication of a
private remedy to compensate an aggrieved individual belonging to that
class of persons whom the statute was designed to protect.-
Sawyer enumerated two tests used by the United States Supreme Court
in decisions concerning implied private rights of action. First:
(1) Is the plaintiff one of a class for whose special benefit the statute
was enacted?
(2) Is there any indication of legislative intent to create or deny such
a remedy?(3) Is it consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme
to impose such a remedy?
(4) Is the cause of action traditionally allocated to state law?"'
Alternatively:
(1) Does the alleged violation contravene the public policy of the state?
(2) Are the plaintiffs within the class the statute was designed to
protect?
(3) Is the injury one the statute was designed to prevent?
(4) Is the need for civil action under the statute clear?
(5) Is there any indication that remedies available are limited to those
enumerated in the act?91
Application of either of these tests would lead to a private action for
violation of the Unfair Practices Act. The statute was clearly designed to
protect insureds. There is no express wording that creates or denies a
private remedy. Although the statute creates an administrative remedy, a
private remedy is not expressly excluded. Certainly a private remedy would
be consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to
protect the public from deceptive practices. Additionally, although state
law traditionally regulates insurance, state law does not regulate private
causes of action against insurers.
Under the test stated in Sherman v. Field Clinic,99 insurance companies
that engage in unfair practices contravene the state's public policy to
protect the welfare of its citizens. The statute was clearly designed to
prevent injuries to claimants. The best way to prevent injuries and com-
pensate claimants would be to allow a private cause of action.
Kinney's ineffectual attempt to distinguish Sawyer is merely a disguised
refusal to follow the holding of the Illinois Supreme Court. Kinney ignored
the Illinois Insurance Laws Commission Final Report regarding the passage
of section 767:
96. Id. at 386-87, 432 N.E.2d at 852.
97. Id. at 388-89, 432 N.E.2d at 853 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
98. Id. at 388-89, 432 N.E.2d at 853 (citing Sherman v. Field Clinic, 74 Ill. App. 3d 21,
29, 392 N.E.2d 154, 160-61 (Ist Dist. 1979)).
99. 74 IMI. App. 3d 21, 392 N.E.2d 154 (1st Dist. 1979). See supra note 98 and accompanying
text.
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Traditionally, punitive damages have been seldom used. However, with
its new prevalence as an integral element of litigation, the Commission
thought that the insurance industry might have taken the opportunity
to utilize the Senate Bill 517 [section 767] to establish statutory limits
on the amount of punitive damages. This was not done.'
The Kinney court refused to consider the Commission's report as evidence
that the legislature intended the report to help interpret the statute: "[w]e
find expressly that this section of the Insurance Code is not ambiguous
and requires no statutory construction."'' The court disagreed with Kelly
v. Stratton, 0 in which a federal district court found that the Commission's
report was sufficient evidence to indicate that the legislature did not intend
to preempt the field by passing section 767. Without providing any further
analysis, Kinney refused to follow the federal district court's decision
because federal decisions are "certainly" not binding on state courts. 0 3
In reaching its decision in Sawyer, the Illinois Supreme Court cited
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. '04 Kelsay found an implied civil remedy under
the Worker's Compensation Act where an employer discharged an em-
ployee for exercising her Worker's Compensation rights. The court found
an implied private right of action even though the Worker's Compensation
Act expressly preempts the field. The court reasoned that, because the
legislature enacted the Worker's Compensation Act as a comprehensive
scheme to protect employees, "[this scheme would be seriously under-
mined if employers were permitted to abuse their power to terminate by
threatening to discharge employees for seeking compensation under the
Act." 0  Similarly, the Unfair Practices Act was passed to protect insureds,
who are placed in a weak position and depend on insurance carriers in
times of disaster. Limiting sanctions to an adminstrative slap on the hand
of no more than $5,000.00 plus attorney fees would undercut this policy.,0 6
The Third Circuit Appellate Court, in Van Vleck v. Ohio Casualty
Insurance Co.,"3' also held that the legislature provided no private cause
of action for violation of Illinois Insurance Code section 766.6.108 Van
Vleck was an assignee of the insured's cause of action against Ohio
I00. Kinney, 120 III. App. 3d at 299, 458 N.E.2d at 83 (quoting ILLINOIS INS. LAWS STUDY
COMM'N, FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND 80TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY).
101. Id.
102. 552 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
103. Kinney, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 299-300, 458 N.E.2d at 83.
104. 74 Il1. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
105. Id. at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
106. Interestingly, California does not permit bad faith actions in the Workers Compensation
context. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 3601 (West 1971); Richard v. Pacific Indem. Co., 132 Cal.
App. 3d 886, 183 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1982). California law states that Workers Compensation is
an exclusive remedy. But see Dill v. Claims Admin. Serv., 178 Cal. App. 3d 1184, 224 Cal.
Rptr. 273 (1986).
107. 128 I1. App. 3d 959, 471 N.E.2d 925 (3d Dist. 1984).
108. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §766.6 (1983).
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Casualty for failure to settle in good faith the claims brought by Van
Vleck against the insured. The complaint alleged that Ohio Casualty failed
to make any offer of settlement or to advise Van Vleck of the policy
limits. 1' 9 The plaintiff particularly relied upon section 766.6(d), which
prohibits "[n]ot attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and
equitable settlement of claims submitted in which liability becomes rea-
sonably clear.""10 The court held that "paragraph 766.6 provides no
private cause of action or remedy beyond those powers given to the State
Director of Insurance in section 766.7 . . .'.
Since the Illinois courts have concluded that the Unfair Practices Act
does not provide a civil remedy, the only causes of action available to
insureds are based on common law theories." 2 Even so, the possibility of
getting a case to trial on available theories is severely limited.
II. PREEMPTION OF COMMON LAW CAUSES OF ACTION BY SECTION 767
The Illinois appellate courts do not follow California's lead in allowing
a private cause of action for statutory violations. The Illinois courts are
also divided on whether any extra-contractual damages are available in
first-party actions against insurers. This division is based on disparate
interpretations of Illinois Insurance Code section 767.111
109. Van Vleck, 128 III. App. 3d at 960, 471 N.E.2d at 92i. The court also dismissed Count
2 of the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
because Van Vleck failed to allege that Ohio Casualty had an opportunity to settle the claim
within the policy limits. Id. at 962, 471 N.E.2d at 928.
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 766.7(d) (1983).
111. Van Vleck, 128 III. App. 3d at 961, 471 N.E.2d at 927.
112. Third-party claimants have no private remedy available except through the assignment
of an insured's cause of action. See infra note 180.
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1985). Section 767 provides for attorney fees. This
provision immediately follows, but is not considered a part of, the Illinois Unfair Practices
Act. The section provides:
(1) In any action by or against a company wherein there is in issue the liability
of a company on a policy or policies of insurance or the amount of the loss payable
thereunder, or for an unreasonable delay in settling a claim, and it appears to the
court that such action or delay is vexatious and unreasonable, the court may allow
as part of the taxable costs in the action reasonable attorney fees, other costs, plus
an amount not to exceed any one of the following amounts:
(a) 25% of the amount which the court or jury finds such party is entitled to
recover against the company, exclusive of all costs;
(b) $5,000;
(c) The excess of the amount which the court or jury finds such party is entitled
to recover, exclusive of costs, over the amount, if any, which the company offered
to pay in settlement of the claim prior to the action.
(2) Where there are several policies insuring the same insured against the same
loss whether issued by the same or by different companies, the court may fix the
amount of the allowance so that the total attorney fees on account of one loss shall
not be increased by reason of the fact that the insured brings separate suits on such
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A. The Fifth District
The leading Illinois case that recognizes a common law cause of action
for an insurer's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is the Fifth District's decision in Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan
for Hosp. Care."4 Ledingham is a well-reasoned opinion that recognizes
a cause of action in tort for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing implied in every insurance contract. A California Supreme Court
case, Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.,"'S influenced the
Ledingham analysis. Fletcher found that an insurer's breach of a disability
insurance contract could give rise to common law tort causes of action
for intentional infliction of emotional harm and for tortious interference
with a protected property interest, and that punitive damages could be
recovered under either theory. Ledingham acknowledged that duties arise
out of an insurance contract beyond the four corners of the policy.
Ledingham declared that Illinois courts should follow California and
recognize the implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court
discussed several important cases, including Fletcher,' 6 Gruenberg v. Aetna
Insurance Co." 7 and Eckenrode v. Life of America Insurance Co." 8
Ledingham stated the general rule excluding punitive damages in a contract
action and approved California's adoption of a separate tort theory based
on the relationship of the parties. The duty arises out of the relationship
created by the insurance contract. Breach of the duty is both a breach of
contract and a tort." 9
Having taken such a bold first step, the court then retreated:
Although in a proper case punitive damages may be awarded where the
refusal to pay benefits is not made in good faith, and without fair
dealing, that is not the case here. The decision to deny benefits was
made in good faith on the basis of the insured's doctor's statement.
The method of communicating that decision, and the behavior of the
company was not "outrageous", nor was it in breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing as that has been previously discussed. We
find that the conduct of the insurer in this case does not rise to the
level of a breach of either tort theory of sufficient gravity that punitive
damages should be granted.'2,
policies.
The original § 767, adopted in 1937, limited the amount of attorney fees recoverable to $500
or 25% of the amount which the court found a party was entitled to recover against an
insurance company, exclusive of all costs, and did not provide for any additional amounts.
Section 767 in its present state was adopted in 1%7. California has no similar provision in its
Insurance Code.
114. 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (5th Dist. 1975).
115. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
116. Id.
117. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
118. 470 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1972).
119. Ledingham, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 349, 330 N.E.2d at 548.
120. Id. at 352, 330 N.E.2d at 549.
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This conclusion is curious. The trial court's factual findings on the
nature of the insurance company's conduct should not be disturbed on
appeal unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated on the record.12'
Ledingham found no abuse of discretion. The appellate court simply
reassessed the culpability of the insurance company's conduct. The court
could have reached this result without the extensive analysis of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing.
As a factual matter, the court found that the company's conduct was
not outrageous, and thus refused to allow punitive damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. However, instead of stopping with this
factual finding, Ledingham revived the Illinois Supreme Court case of
Knierim v. Izzo.122 Knierim held that punitive damages are inappropriate
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Additionally, although
Ledingham seemed to announce a tendency in Illinois to follow the Cal-
ifornia analysis, it has been criticized or distinguished by each of the other
Illinois Appellate Districts.
B. The First District
In Tobolt v. Allstate Insurance Co., 23 the First District Appellate Court
criticized Ledingham for its failure to consider section 767 of the Illinois
Insurance Code. Plaintiffs claimed that Allstate refused, in bad faith, to
pay the amount due under a homeowner's policy after a fire. The court
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint for intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress, and failure to act in good faith.
The court permitted plaintiff to proceed only under a breach of contract
theory. In order to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the court had to find that Allstate's conduct was not
extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. 24
The court relied on the Third District's interpretation of Ledingham in
Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.:
We consider it to be of considerable import in the instant case that
our State legislature has provided a remedy to insureds where an insur-
ance company's refusal to pay or honor its contract is unreasonable
and vexatious. Section 767 of the Illinois Insurance Code ... permits
an insured to recover attorney fees (25% of the amount the plaintiff is
entitled to recover or $1,000 or whichever is the less) if it appears to
the court that the insurer's refusal to pay is vexatious and without
reasonable cause. This statutory provision has been the law in our state
since 1967.
121. Fassola v. Montgomery Ward Ins. Co., 104 Ill. App. 3d 825, 433 N.E.2d 378 (3d Dist.
1982).
122. 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
123. 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (lst Dist, 1979).
124. See infra notes 246-53 and accompanying text.
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We are of the opinion that the legislature has intended to provide a
remedy to an insured who encounters unnecessary difficulties with an
unreasonable and vexatious insurance company. The insured can main-
tain an action on the contract for recovery of withheld policy benefits
and upon proper finding by the court can be awarded attorney fees in
addition to all other costs. Where the legislature has provided a remedy
on a subject matter we are not only loath but in addition harbor serious
doubts as to the desirability and wisdom of implementing or expanding
the legislative remedy by judicial decree.'"
Tobolt specifically recognized that California has no statute similar to
Illinois' section 767.126 The court cited Urfer v. Country Mutual Insurance
Co.,' 7 which also criticized Ledingham and followed Debolt. 28 Urfer held
that section 767 preempts all other remedies. Interestingly, the Tobolt
court commented, "We also note that in 1977 the legislature agreed that
section 767 had preempted the field when it amended that section to
increase the recovery for vexatious delay.' '29
The court's comment follows a strange logic: because the reason for the
remedy is broadened, access to other remedies is thereby limited. Further,
section 767's title, "Attorney Fees",'30 does not limit cause of action or
remedy. Had the legislature intended to preempt tort theories of recovery
or remedies, the section would refer to "Remedies" or "Amounts Re-
coverable in Addition to Contract Benefits." On this issue, Tobolt noted
that, "in the interpretation of the meaning of a particular section the
plain meaning of the substantive provisions of the section cannot be limited
by its heading."' 3 A more likely reason for the statute's heading is that,
since attorney fees are not generally available for breach of contract, the
heading and the statutory remedy are specific in order to avoid the general
rule which precludes recovery of attorney fees. Similarly, California Civil
Code section 3294 is entitled "Punitive Damages."' 3 Section 3294 specif-
ically permits punitive damages in causes of action where these damages
have been historically unavailable. No one has ever argued that section
3294 limits the availability of compensatory damages in any way. 33
Illinois Insurance Code section 767 is a broadly worded statute that
greatly affects the common law recovery of attorney fees for breach of
125. Tobolt, 75 111. App. 3d at 68-69, 393 N.E.2d at 1179 (citations omitted) (quoting Debolt
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 56 Ill. App. 3d II1, 114-16, 371 N.E.2d 373, 376-78 (3d Dist.
1978)).
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1983).
127. 60 Ill. App. 3d 469, 376 N.E.2d 1073 (4th Dist. 1978).
128. 56 I1. App. 3d 111, 371 N.E.2d 373 (3d Dist. 1978).
129. Tobolt, 75 111. App. 3d at 70-71, 393 N.E.2d at 1180 (citation omitted).
130. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1983).
131. 75 111. App. 3d at 71, 393 N.E.2d at 1181 (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 331 U.S. 519 (1946)).
132. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1972).
133. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text. For a discussion of recovery of attorney
fees, see infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
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insurance contract. Section 767 addresses a single additional item of
damages recoverable for a particular activity: attorney fees may be re-
covered if the court finds the company's conduct vexatious or unreason-
able.
Tobolt also noted that "to the extent that Eckenrode v. Life of America
Insurance Co. 34 may be considered to hold to the contrary with reference
to section [7671, it is not binding upon Illinois courts."'" The court was
referring to a footnote in Eckenrode:
Defendant argues that Illinois Rev. Stat. ch. 73, section 767, Attorney
Fees, limits plaintiff's recovery to $1,000. However, defendant cites no
decision for its position. And we think that the statute by its terms is
limited to attorney fees and does not militate against our decision.""
The First District further distanced itself from the Eckenrode/Led-
ingham line in Kinney v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. '17 The plaintiffs
in Kinney alleged that the defendant failed to make a good faith settlement
offer on their homeowners insurance claim for snow damage. The court
cited not only Tobolt,13 8 Urfer,3 9 and Debolt, 40 but also Hamilton,4' and
Hoffman,'4 2 as standing for the proposition that Illinois Insurance Code
section 767 preempts any common law cause of action for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
C. The Second District
In Hoffman v. Allstate Insurance Co., '4 1 the Second District Appellate
Court agreed with Tobolt,' 44 Debolt,'"4 and Urfer' 46 that section 767 pre-
cludes recovery of punitive damages. However, the court upheld plaintiff's
claim for compensatory damages. The court observed that "paragraph
767, on its face, does not preempt a plaintiff's right to claim compensatory
damages for a breach of good faith and fair dealing."'' 47 This result
indicates a significant split of opinion. The First District makes no dis-
134. 470 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1972). Eckenrode was cited in Ledingham and decided prior to
Debolt.
135. Tobolt, 75 Ill. App. 3d at 71, 393 N.E.2d at 1181.
136. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d I, 5 n.5 (7th Cir. 1972).
137. 120 III. App. 3d 294, 458 N.E.2d 79 (Ist Dist. 1983). See supra notes 87-106 and
accompanying text.
138. 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (Ist Dist. 1979).
139. 60 I11. App. 3d 469, 376 N.E.2d 1073 (4th Dist. 1978).
140. 56 Ill. App. 3d 111, 371 N.E.2d 373 (3d Dist. 1978).
141. 104 Ill. App. 3d 353, 432 N.E.2d 996 (Ist Dist. 1982).
142. 85 Ill. App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156 (2d Dist. 1980).
143. Id.
144. 75 111. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (Ist Dist. 1979).
145. 56 II1. App. 3d 11I, 371 N.E.2d 373 (3d Dist. 1978).
146. 60 I11. App. 3d 469, 376 N.E.2d 1073 (4th Dist. 1978).
147. Hoffman, 85 Iil. App. 3d at 635, 407 N.E.2d at 159.
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tinction between compensatory and punitive damages. If section 767
preempts punitive damages, it must preempt extra-contractual compensa-
tory damages as well, because section 767 offers the only remedy beyond
contract benefits.
48
D. The Fourth District
In Lynch v. Mid-America Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,149 the Fourth
District Appellate Court gingerly disagreed with the First District. Lynch
determined whether or not section 767 preempted a common law tort
action before the 1977 amendment. ToboltI said that the 1977 amendment
was merely a further indication of the legislative intent to preempt available
remedies. Lynch held, however, that before its amendment, section 767
did not preempt the field. Significantly, the court reserved its opinion as
to whether the present section 767 preempts a common law tort action.,
The court reasoned correctly that even if section 767 limited the damages
available, a cause of action could still be brought. The reasoning in Lynch
leaves the Fourth District in a position to hold that the current section
767 does not preempt other remedies because the amendment simply added
recovery for vexatious delay. This amendment would not substantively
affect the preemption question.
Lynch favored the Second District's holding in Hoffman:
The appellate court [in Hoffman] held the request for punitive dam-
ages to have been properly stricken but that a cause of action existed
for compensatory damages. It noted the preemption theory expressed
in Debolt, Tobolt and the Urfer concurrence, interpreted them as holding
that section (7671 preempted any claim by an insured for punitive
damages and adopted that interpretation. The court then reasoned that
nevertheless, section [767] did not, on its face, "preempt a plaintiff's
right to claim compensatory damages for a breach of good faith and
fair dealing." The opinion did not indicate that plaintiff's claim for
those compensatory damages was being made under section 1767]. The
opinion thus appears to disagree with Tobolt's holding that no cause
of action exists for compensatory damages for an insurer's failure to
deal in good faith with its insured.'
Obviously, section 767 does not, on its face, preempt punitive damages.
Lynch emphasized that section 767 merely granted discretionary authority
to award attorney fees as costs. The court reasoned:
148. See Tobolt, 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (1st Dist. 1979). The Toboli court
relied on Debolt and Urfer to conclude that § 766 preempted punitive and compensatory
damages, although the section only addresses itself to attorney fees arising out of a vexatious
lawsuit. Id. at 70-71, 393 N.E.2d at 1180-81.
149. 94 Ill. App. 3d 21, 418 N.E.2d 421 (4th Dist. 1981).
150. 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (Ist Dist. 1979).
151. Lynch, 94 Il1. App. 3d at 26, 418 N.E.2d at 426.
152. Id. at 25, 418 N.E.2d at 425 (citations omitted).
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The fees were limited and even in this case could not have exceeded
$1,000. The tenor of this section gives no indication that it was intended
to cover the field of awarding compensation for bad faith or vexatious
dealing by insurers. The Tobolt court reasoned that the amendment
providing for a limited discretionary case award evidenced a prior intent
to preempt the field. Even if the present section [767] indicates such a
present intent, we do not see how that could relate to the prior legislative
intent. Where legislation is amended to grant a power expressly, the
amendment has been interpreted to indicate a legislative acknowledgment
of a previous lack of that power . . . By analogy to that rule, legislative
amendments to add provisions indicating a legislative intent to preempt
a field could be deemed to be an acknowledgment that the provisions
amended did not previously preempt. We express no opinion as to
whether the present section (767] preempts the field."'
Lynch also cited the Illinois Supreme Court's reliance on Ledingham in
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,"' as standing for the rule that a separate tort
action can arise from conduct that also involves a breach of contract."'
Lynch, like Ledingham, broadly stated the law but refused to find the
necessary supporting facts. In Lynch, the defendant insurer refused to
settle plaintiff's fire insurance claim on a commercial building based on
an "at best, uncertain" arson defense. 56 Lynch was unable to make
payments on the building because of the insurer's refusal to pay. The
same attorney who represented the insurer also represented the mortgagee
of the building in foreclosure proceedings. Additionally, there was a
dispute as to whether the insurer refused to provide or inform Lynch of
the proof of loss form required for compensation. Accordingly, the jury
found that defendant's conduct constituted bad faith, and the appellate
court affirmed. However, the court reversed the jury award of $150,000.00
in compensatory damages as contrary to the manifest weight of the evi-
dence and also reversed the jury's award of $100,000.00 in punitive
damages, stating, "[n]o case has been called to our attention holding that
evidence supporting an award of compensatory damages for an insurer's
failure to settle the claim in good faith necessarily supports an award for
punitive damages.'""
153. Id. at 25-26, 418 N.E.2d at 425 (citations omitted).
154. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 187, 384 N.E.2d 353, 360 (1978).
155. Based on this implied approval of Ledingham by the Illinois Supreme Court, Lynch
held that, at least prior to the amendment of § 766, "[t]here existed a tort action for the refusal
of an insurer to make payments due its insured, limited to those circumstances where the refusal
was in bad faith." Lynch, 94 111. App. 3d at 26, 418 N.E.2d at 426.
156. Id. at 28, 418 N.E.2d at 427. The insurer also claimed the plaintiff had other existing
insurance at the time of the fire, although plaintiff's other policy had terminated just before
the issuance of the policy in suit. Id.
157. Id. at 29, 418 N.E.2d at 428. The court felt that the evidence presented as to plaintiff's
compensatory damages was inadequate, although none of the evidence presented had been
disputed by defense counsel. Id. The court reversed the punitive damages award, saying the
insurer's conduct was not fraudulent. Id. The court failed to consider that other conduct besides
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This statement is too simple. The factual finding of bad faith affirmed
by the appellate court forms the basis for extra-contractual compensatory
damages unless these damages are not proven. It is not the award of
compensatory damages but the culpability of the defendant that forms the
basis for punitive damages. By affirming the jury finding of bad faith,
the appellate court has approved the factual foundation upon which to
award punitive damages.
The Fourth District has also created a broad exception to preemption
under section 767 where the defendant is a non-profit health care service.
In McCall v. Health Care Service Corp.,' 58 the court held that because
non-profit health care services are exempt from the Insurance Code, they
are also exempt from section 767 of the Insurance Code. Non-profit health
care services are subject to a common law tort action for bad faith.
The plaintiff in McCall sued Blue Cross, alleging that Blue Cross
breached its duty to deal fairly and in good faith by delaying payment on
a claim. The appellate court reversed the lower court's dismissal of plain-
tiff's first amended complaint. McCall noted that Ledingham recognized
a tort action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The court distinguished Debolt,5 9 Tobolt,' 60 and Hoffman 6' as
concerning stock or mutual companies subject to the Illinois Insurance
Code.
No other Illinois decisions involving insurance companies regulated by
the Insurance Code have distinguished Ledingham on this basis, even
though Ledingham also involved an action against Blue Cross. Had Debolt,
Tobolt and other decisions relied on this distinction, the preemption
analysis would have been unnecessary. Arguably, many of the principles
announced in Ledingham are too appealing to be discarded peremptorily.
McCall noted that "while all of these cases discuss preemption, it is
noteworthy that such preemption did not change the nature of the tort
fraud, such as wantonness, malice, oppression or circumstances of aggravation, supports an
award of punitive damages in Illinois. See Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 87, 174 N.E.2d 157,
165 (1961). Defendant's failure to work out an agreement with the mortgagee to forestall the
foreclosure, especially when its own counsel represented the mortgagee, could reasonably be
considered "oppression." The jury also found that defendant's agents had "led plaintiff to
believe that no formal filing of proof of loss was necessary." Lynch, 94 111. App. 3d at 29,
418 N.E.2d at 428. This conduct could reasonably be considered "malicious." The court's
statement that the evidence did not "necessarily support" a punitive damages award is correct
as far as it goes. Punitive damages are never given as a matter of right. However, since the
punitive damages award was clearly not the product of "passion or prejudice," the appellate
court should have left the amount of punitive damages within "the sound discretion of the
trier of fact, whether judge or jury." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
158. 117 Ill. App. 3d 107, 452 N.E.2d 893 (4th Dist. 1983).
159. 56 111. App. 3d III, 371 N.E.2d 373 (3d Dist. 1978).
160. 75 IIl. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (ist Dist. 1979).
161. 85 111. App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156 (2d Dist. 1980).
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but only the items of damage and the amount thereof."'' 62 The court called
bad faith the "semantic equivalent of vexatious and unreasonable de-
lay . 1 
63
E. Conclusion
The First and Third District Appellate Courts have found that section
767 preempts both a common law tort action for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and all remedies.' 64 The Fourth
District has found that section 767 did not preempt other remedies before
its amendment and has not reached the issue of post-amendment preemp-
tion. 165 The Second District allows an action for extra-contractual com-
pensatory damages, but not punitive damages. 66 The Fifth District stands
alone in allowing a cause of action for tortious breach of an insurance
contract with both punitive and compensatory damages available.
67
III. EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 767
The reasons for imposing greater duties upon an insurance carrier than
those written into the insurance contract are rooted in a sound public
policy that recognizes the quasi-fiduciary role of insurers in modern so-
ciety. Punitive damages encourage insurance carriers to comply with public
policy as declared in the Unfair Practices Act. Section 767 is merely an
additional item of compensatory damages. If section 767 preempts recovery
of extra-contractual damages, including punitive damages, it is ineffective
as a sanction and actually undermines the intent of the Unfair Practices
Act.
In California, the cause of action for tortious breach of contract stemmed
from the courts' gradual recognition of situations in which one party to
a contract owed a "special duty" to the other party. For example, early
California decisions recognized that a plaintiff could recover extra-con-
tractual damages when a common carrier breached the special duty of
care owed to its passengers. 16 As society becomes more complex, the
special duty concept has expanded to include other situations in which a
162. 117 III. App. 3d at III, 452 N.E.2d at 896.
163. Id. at I11, 452 N.E.2d at 897. Other conduct besides delay may constitute bad faith.
Presumably the acts prohibited by § 766.6 of the Illinois Insurance Code describe other bad
faith conduct by insurers. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 766.66 (1985).
164. Tobolt, 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (1st Dist. 1979); Debol, 56 Il. App. 3d
Ill, 371 N.E.2d 373 (3d Dist. 1978).
165. Lynch, 94 I1. App. 3d 21, 418 N.E.2d 421 (4th Dist. 1981).
166. Hoffman, 85 Il1. App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156 (2d Dist. 1980).
167. Ledingham, 29 I1. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (5th Dist. 1975). Ledingham was the
only one of these five cases to be heard by the Illinois Supreme Court, which reversed it on
other grounds. 64 Il. 2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976).
168. Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., III Cal. 668, 444 P. 320 (18%).
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special relationship is involved. Landlords,' 69 banks,7 0 and employers' 7'
have been held subject to this special duty. Although the special duty
arises out of the execution of a contract, its breach constitutes a tort, for
which tort damages, including punitive damages, are available.
California courts have extended this special duty to insurance contracts.
The courts have reasoned that insurers, like common carriers, have a
special duty to their insureds. The breach of that duty may give rise to a
cause of action sounding in tort.
The insurers' obligations are ... rooted in their status as purveyors of
a vital service labeled quasi-public in nature .... [Als a supplier of a
public service rather than a manufactured product, the obligations of
insurers go beyond meeting reasonable expectations of coverage ....
Insurers hold themselves out as fiduciaries, and with the public's trust
must go private responsibility consonant with that trust .... Further-
more, the relationship of insurer and insured is inherently unbalanced;
the adhesive nature of insurance contracts places the insurer in a superior
bargaining position. The availability of punitive damages is thus com-
patible with recognition of insurers' underlying public obligations and
reflects an attempt to restore balance in the contractual relationship.'72
Illinois recognized a cause of action for a common carrier's tortious
breach of contract in Nevin v. Pullman Palace Car Co.171 In Nevin, the
plaintiff and his family were refused, without justification, a berth in a
sleeping car. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff's con-
tractual remedy was limited to recovery of the ticket fare, but held that
an action on the tort would lie since the defendant was a common carrier
with a special duty to its passengers.
Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. '14 refused to extend Nevin
to an action seeking extra-contractual damages against an insurance carrier
who refused to pay policy benefits. The court reasoned that although mere
contractual recovery would be inadequate in a common carrier case because
the recovery would be limited to the price of the ticket, contractual
damages in a breach of insurance contract action would be sufficient
because that was the extent of the insured's bargain. The Debolt reasoning
ignores the primary reason for insurance. An insured buys insurance,
169. Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1971).
170. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 551 (1985).
171. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 836
(1980).
172. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482, 487-88 (1979) (quoting Goodman & Seaton, Foreword: Ripe For Decision, Internal
Workings And Current Concerns Of The California Supreme Court, 62 CAL. L. REv. 309, 346-
47 (1974)); Hirsch, Carpenter & Carpenter, Strict Liability: A Response to the Gruenberg-
Silberg Conflict Regarding Insurance Litigation Awards, 7 Sw. U.L. REV. 310, 326 (1975).
173. 106 Ill. 222 (1883).
174. 56 I1. App. 3d Ill, 371 N.E.2d 373 (3d Dist. 1978).
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particularly liability insurance, in order to obtain peace of mind by re-
ducing risk. In fact, Illinois courts have held that an insurer has a good
faith obligation to its insured to make a reasonable attempt to settle a
third party's claim within the policy limits, and have permitted extra-
contractual damages for breach of this obligation. 75
Illinois appellate courts have declined to extend the preemptive effect
of section 767 to third-party "duty to settle" cases. These cases involve
an action by the insured against the insurer for the breach of the insurer's
duty to reasonably negotiate a claim by a third party that results in a
judgment in excess of the insured's policy limits. 76 The excess verdict
exposes the insured to an amount in excess of the contract benefits. This
excess liability would be unrecoverable in a contract action, even if the
plaintiff obtained the remedies provided in section 767. Section 767 was
enacted as a cure for unreasonable and vexatious delay in paying contract
benefits, and, therefore, is unrelated to an action based on an insurer's
unreasonable failure to settle a third-party claim within policy limits. An
excess judgment is a foreseeable result of a breach of the duty to settle
under a liability policy. Both insurer and insured contract with precisely
this risk in mind. Thus, section 767 does not affect these contract damages.
Although the amount of the excess verdict may be recovered, extra-
contractual and punitive damages are unavailable under this analysis be-
cause the action is considered purely a contract action for foreseeable
contract damages. 77
Debolt distinguishes the "duty to settle" cases upon which Ledingham
relied. Debolt found third-party cases inapplicable:
Where the insurer ignores the interest of its insured and judgment in
excess of policy limits is awarded the insurer will be compelled to pay
the excess. We do not deem the "duty to settle" cases pertinent to the
instant case since the insurer's discretion and control is not absolute.' 7'
175. LaRotunda v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 87 II1. App. 3d 446, 408 N.E.2d 928 (Ist Dist.
1980) (insurer's breach of its duty to defend insureds against suit rendered insurer liable for
costs of defense and for maximum amount of policy coverage).
176. See Debolt, 56 Ill. App. 3d at 115, 371 N.E.2d at 377.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 282-83. California considers an insurer's bad faith
failure to settle a third-party claim to be a breach of a different aspect of the insurer's common
law duty of good faith and fair dealing. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 574, 510
P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1973). The insured may bring a tort action for both
the excess verdict and noncontractual damages (e.g., emotional distress, punitive damages).
However, only the claim for the excess verdict is assignable. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17
Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976). Because the claim in Illinois is only for
the excess verdict, the entire claim may be assigned. See Phelan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 114 Ill. App. 3d 96, 448 N.E.2d 579 (Ist Dist. 1983); LaRotunda v. Royal Globe Ins.
Co., 87 111. App. 3d 446, 408 N.E.2d 928 (Ist Dist. 1980).
178. Debolt, 56 Ill. App. 3d at 115, 371 N.E.2d at 377. However, the insurer's discretion is
never absolute; it is always subject to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
regardless of the type of claim or policy, and it is always governed by the standards set out in
the Unfair Practices Act.
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Debolt views the insurance contract relationship too narrowly. The courts
have generally allowed extra-contractual damages where contractual dam-
ages would be inadequate for a party to a quasi-fiduciary relationship
who depended on the other party to uphold a contract. For example, a
plaintiff who buys a ticket from a common carrier places his entitlement
to safe travel in the hands of the carrier. If he suffers while captive on
his journey he may recover more than the refunded ticket. Similarly, a
person who contracts with an innkeeper expects to be provided with a
safe bed away from home. Recovery of the price of the room, leaving the
traveler stranded, would be inadequate. In the same way, a party who
contracts with an insurance company, does not seek "by the contract...
to obtain a commercial advantage but to protect against the risk of
accidental losses, including the mental distress which might follow from
the losses."' 7 9 An insurer's breach of its duty to an insured creates just
the sort of damage the insured sought to protect against by entering into
the contract.'80
Debolt held that since the insured could recover attorney fees over and
above section 767 contractual damages, extra-contractual damages, in-
cluding punitive damages, are precluded because there is no cause of
action in tort. The court found it to be of "considerable import'" 8' that
section 767 of the Illinois Insurance Code was enacted by the state legis-
lature to provide a remedy to insureds "where an insurance company's
refusal to pay or honor its contract is unreasonable and vexatious." 8
The court confuses "remedy" and "cause of action," and, thus, its
reasoning is circular. If section 767 is a remedy, it would not necessarily
prohibit a cause of action. The confusion lies partially in the significance
Debolt attaches to a finding of vexatious and unreasonable conduct under
the statute. These factual findings are the underpinnings of additional
contract damages and not an independent cause of action. If the insurer
breaches the insurance contract, the insured is entitled to the benefits
under the contract. If, in addition, this breach is unreasonable and vex-
atious, the insured may recover limited attorney fees.
This is simply a two-step analysis of a single cause of action. Separate
causes of action sounding in tort could still be brought and traditional
179. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
180. Even if the special duty concept were not extended to insurance contracts, some breach
of contract cases permit recovery of emotional distress if that type of damage is foreseeable.
Historically, a party breaching a contract that involves a corpse (e.g., a mortuary/cemetery
contract) must pay the other party damages for emotional distress. The cause of action does
not sound in tort and is not based upon a special duty. Rather, the cause of action is for
breach of contract, and damages for emotional distress are recoverable not as extra-contractual
damages, but as damages foreseeable under the contract. Similarly, damages for emotional
distress for an insurer's breach of an insurance contract are foreseeable and should be recover-
able.
181. Debolt, 56 III. App. 3d at 115-16, 371 N.E.2d at 377.
182. Id.
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tort remedies recovered. Such separate actions could be based on the
insurer's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion of policy ben-
efits, etc. No disservice is done to section 767, because plaintiffs would
be fully compensated, and fair claims practices would be encouraged.
Debolt notes Ledingham's reliance on California cases but reasons that
California does not have a statutory provision that permits an insured to
recover attorney fees.' 83 In fact, punitive damages are statutory in Cali-
fornia.18 4 The missing link in Debolt's analysis is that attorney fees are
compensatory and not punitive.
According to Debolt:
It could well be argued that the rationale of the California courts is
that absent a statutory remedy punitive damages will be allowed to an
aggrieved party who has been mistreated by an insurer . . . We believe
the remedy provided in [section 767 of the Illinois Insurance Code! is
highly significant in that it provides a remedy for an insured and thereby
attempts to keep him harmless resulting from the misconduct of his
insurer. "I
Punitive damages may be characterized as a remedy in that they serve
a remedial purpose by affecting future conduct. In contrast, attorney fees
are compensation for a past loss. California has allowed punitive damages
because the cause of action sounds in tort. Historically, both compensatory
and punitive damages are permitted in tort actions. Public policy has long
supported compensatory damages for tort victims and sanctions against
sufficiently culpable tortfeasors.' 86 Although section 767 provides for at-
torney fees, such fees should be awarded in addition to the compensatory
and punitive damages available as a remedy for a tort cause of action.
Punitive damages should be available for conduct exceeding vexatious and
unreasonable delay, such as malice, fraud or oppression.
Deboit,'87 Urfer't8 and Tobolt'8 9 fail to recognize three obstacles. First,
even if section 767 were an exclusive remedy for an insurer's vexatious
and unreasonable conduct, both Illinois and California require something
more than vexatious and unreasonable conduct to award punitive damages
against a defendant. Second, the purpose of punitive damages is to deter
183. Id. at 115-16, 371 N.E.2d at 378. But see Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813,
693 P.2d 796, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1985) (attorney fees are recoverable to the extent that they
relate to fees incurred in attempting to recover benefits due under contract of insurance; punitive
damages are available in addition to attorney fees in such cases).
184. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1972).
185. 56 Ill. App. 3d at 117, 371 N.E.2d at 378.
186. See W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 535 (6th
ed. 1976).
187. 56 Ill. App. 3d 111, 371 N.E.2d 373 (3d Dist. 1978).
188. 60 Ill. App. 3d 469, 376 N.E.2d 1073 (4th Dist. 1978).
189. 75 111. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (Ist Dist. 1979).
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and set an example, not to compensate the plaintiff. Third, as a practical
matter, section 767 fails as an economic disincentive to unfair claims
practices.
For example, Debol'90 found that section 767 provides "a remedy for
an insured and thereby attempts to keep him harmless resulting from the
misconduct of his insurer."' 9 ' Punitive damages are not awarded to keep
a plaintiff "harmless," but to punish the defendant. The conduct of the
defendant, not the damages of the insured, is at issue.
California Civil Code section 3294(a) allows punitive damages only
"where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or mal-
ice . . . ." It defines such conduct as:
I. "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to
cause injury to the plaintiff or conduct which is carried on by the
defendant with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
2. "Oppression" means subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hard-
ship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.
3. "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or a con-
cealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention
on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property
or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.' 92
The California courts have only allowed punitive damages where the
insurer's conduct exceeds "vexatious or unreasonable."'" Under Illinois
common law, punitive damages may be awarded only where the defendant
has acted with fraud, actual malice, violence, oppression, or with such
gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others. 94
Attorney fees can be recovered under section 767 even without the
showing of actual injury necessary to justify an award of compensatory
damages in tort.' The statute creates a standard for recovery that is
easier to satisfy than the common law standard for punitive damages.
Where the insurer's conduct is more than vexatious and unreasonable,
punitive damages should be available in Illinois. 96
Illinois has no statute similar to California Civil Code section 3294, and
therefore follows the common law. The Restatement (Second) of Torts,
section 908, provides:
190. 56 Ill. App. 3d I1, 371 N.E.2d 373 (3d Dist. 1978).
191. Id. at 117, 371 N.E.2d at 378 (emphasis added).
192. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1972).
193. See generally Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232,
102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972) (oppression); G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App.
3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975) (malice); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.
App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (fraud); Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., II Cal. 3d
452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974) (conscious disregard of plaintiff's rights).





(I) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nom-
inal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous
conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in
the future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous,
because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to
the rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can
properly consider the character of the defendant's act, the nature and
extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended
to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
. . . . [Tihe purpose of punitive damages is not compensation of the
plaintiff but the punishment of the defendant and deterrence...
[P]unitive damages may be awarded because of, and measured by, [the
defendant's] wrongful purpose or intent . . .
. . . . Whether to award punitive damages and the determination of the
amount, are within the sound discretion of the trier of fact, whether
judge or jury.' 91
Illinois courts have overlooked the deterrent purpose of punitive damages
by holding that section 767 fully compensates plaintiffs:
The wealth of the defendant is also relevant since the purposes of
exemplary damages are to punish for a past event and to prevent future
offenses, and the degree of punishment for deterrence resulting from a
judgment is to some extent in proportion to the means of the guilty
person.' 9"
California courts examine four factors to assess the amount of punitive
damages:
(a) The reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.
(b) The defendant's wealth.
(c) The amount of compensatory damages.
(d) The amount necessary to deter future conduct.'99
The reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct is relevant to the amount
of punitive damages, and irrelevant to the amount that the plaintiff has
been awarded in compensatory damages. Compensatory damages are in
issue to determine the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, not to
determine if the plaintiff has been properly compensated. The defendant's
wealth is frequently critical in determining the amount necessary to deter
and punish the defendant and to remove any financial incentive for similar
conduct by others.
The Illinois courts have generally agreed that section 767's legislatively
mandated limit on damages for an insurer's vexatious and unreasonable
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979) (emphasis added).
198. Id. § 908(e).
199. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 807-10, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 380-
83 (1981).
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delay is the equivalent of punitive damages. This acknowledgment disre-
gards the common law policy behind punitive damages and denies any
opportunity to deter the unfair practices of insurers. A statutory limit of
$5,000.00 is insufficient to deter most insurance carriers from engaging in
unfair practices. Only the possibility of punitive damages can create a
sufficient deterrent.
Punitive damages have traditionally been available in an intentional tort
action. Thus, punitive damages should be available against an insurance
company for common law fraud, conversion and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. However, when the Illinois Supreme Court first rec-
ognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Knierim
v. Izzo,2°° it held that punitive damages are not recoverable for this tort
in Illinois.
In Knierim, the defendant threatened to kill the plaintiff's husband and
subsequently followed through with the murder. The plaintiff alleged no
physical injury except that the defendant's conduct caused an "oppressive
and undesirable disturbance of her mental tranquility. "'01 In settling the
propriety of a request for punitive damages, the court held:
Generally, [punitive] damages may be recovered in cases where the
wrongful act complained of is characterized by wantonness, malice,
oppression or circumstances of aggravation ... The alleged conduct of
the defendant in intentionally causing the severe emotional disturbance
is characterized by these elements. Indeed it is the outrageous nature of
his conduct that forms the basis for the action.
We believe, nevertheless, that punitive damages cannot be sanctioned
as an additional recovery in such an action. Since the outrageous quality
of the defendant's conduct forms the basis of the action, the rendition
of compensatory damages will be sufficiently punitive. 02
Since an action for the tort lies only when the defendant's conduct comes
under the category in which punitive damages are recoverable, the court
reasoned that a punitive damage award would constitute double recovery.
This reasoning is problematic. Compensatory damages are awarded to
compensate the plaintiff for emotional distress caused by the defendant's
conduct. The actual amount of compensation may or may not influence
a defendant's future conduct because the plaintiff may not prove damages
of an amount sufficient to reach and "sting" the defendant. Particularly
in the corporate setting, the defendant's wealth must be considered both
to reach that defendant and to remove the profitability of unfair practices
in the market place. There is no double recovery, because punitive damages
are over and above compensation.
Although the defendant's conduct might always constitute conduct for
which punitive damages could be awarded, punitive damages are never
200. 22 111.2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
201. Id. at 83, 174 N.E.2d at 163.
202. Id. at 87-88, 174 N.E.2d at 165 (citations omitted).
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allowed as a matter of right. If the full compensation of the plaintiff also
constitutes a significant amount of the defendant's wealth, punitive dam-
ages are unnecessary because their purpose will already have been served.
It is always within the discretion of the trier of fact to award punitive
damages.
Punitive damages are not considered compensatory, but rather exem-
plary. Thus, a second and ever-present challenge arises in the argument
that the plaintiff is the recipient of a "windfall" that exceeds his com-
pensatory or actual damages. In California, active insurance litigators
have been promoting efforts to form a "victims' fund," or a charitable
organization into which defendant insurers would pay punitive damage
awards. The insurance industry is the most vehement opponent of this
and similar plans. As long as a carrier can argue that a plaintiff is getting
more than he deserves, the carrier can sway sympathetic jurors and law-
makers. However, if defendant insurers would deposit punitive damages
into such a fund, the insurers could no longer rely on juror sympathy.
Rather, insurers would be forced to defend themselves solely on their
conduct. Naturally, the insurance industry opposes such plans.
The insurance industry also has considerable influence in Illinois.0 3 In
Roberts v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., 204 the United States
District Court discussed the legislative history of section 767. The court
reviewed testimony by Bernard E. Epton, a former state representative
and Chairman of the Insurance Laws Study Commission from 1971-1983.
Epton testified that the Commission believed that section 767 "provided
the sole source of recovery in Illinois by a first party insurance claim-
ant. ' 20 5 Epton said the insurance industry supported the bill, "as evidenced
by the nearly unanimous votes of both houses of the legislature. ' 2 6 In a
footnote, the court found "interesting the implication that the bill would
not have done so well had the industry not backed it. ' '207
In fact, twenty-eight of the two hundred largest property-casualty in-
surance companies in America are based in Illinois, including the three
largest: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Allstate In-
surance Company, and State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Company.20 8
There are more property/casualty carriers in Illinois than in any other
state, and Illinois ranks fourth among states in the number of life insurance
companies. 209
203. One commentator has declared, "Illinois has long been considered one of the more
hospitable states from which to operate an insurance company," basing his conclusion on the
regulatory and legislative climate of the state. A. TOBIAS, THE INVISIBLE BANKERS 30 (1982).
204. 568 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. III. 1983).
205. Id. at 550.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 550 n.34.
208. See BEST'S KEY RATING GUIDE, PROPERTY-CASUALTY (1985).
209. Id. at 30.
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A final challenge is that punitive damages raise premium rates. In
California, insurance companies may not pass on to consumers losses
resulting from punitive damages. Department of Insurance Accounting
Statement 84-1 provides, in part:
The accrual of punitive or monetary damage loss contingencies ... may
be charged to the underwriting loss or expense account in the annual
statement; however, these amounts must be deducted from losses or
expenses prior to determining any underwriting or rating calculations.2'0
In California, underwriting losses form the basis for calculating the rates
that are regulated by the Department of Insurance. Since punitive damage
amounts must be deducted from underwriting losses before rates are
calculated, these losses cannot be passed on to the consumer in the form
of increased rates. 2'
Insurance companies in Illinois could conceivably pass on the cost of
punitive damage awards to consumers. However, raising rates would affect
competition with foreign carriers having lower rates. Illinois is an "open
competition" state because insurance rates are unregulated. The remedy
for potentially inflated rates is not to prohibit punitive damages, but to
enact legislation that would prevent insurers from passing on the costs of
their unlawful conduct to the innocent consumer.
IV. THE PLAINTIFF'S BuRDENS OF PLEADING AND PROOF
A. Ledingham v. Blue Cross
Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care2' sets forth the circum-
stances under which a plaintiff may recover punitive damages for an
insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In Ledingham,
the insurers refused benefits to the insured based on her doctor's uncer-
tainty as to whether her illness developed before or after the health
insurance policy was issued. 213 In determining whether the conduct of the
insurer was sufficiently outrageous to support the award of punitive
damages, the court relied on the California case of Fletcher v. Western
National Life Insurance Co. 214
210. STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE ACCOUNTING STATEMENT 84-1 (Nov.
26, 1984).
211. See generally CAL. INS. CODE § 1850-1860 (West 1972).
212. 29 III. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (5th Dist. 1975).
213. Id. at 341-42, 330 N.E.2d at 542. The insured applied for insurance approximately five
weeks after a PAP test was done for cancer of the uterus. The test was negative. The policy
was effective August I, 1969. On August 3, the insured experienced prolonged and excessive
bleeding. A hysterectomy was eventually performed. Id. at 341, 330 N.E.2d at 542.
214. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
Fletcher framed the issue this way:
Whether threatened and actual bad faith refusals to make payments under a
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Ledingham agreed with Fletcher that punitive damages are recoverable
in an action for interference with a protected property interest. However,
the court relied on the Illinois Supreme Court case of Knierim v. Izzo,25
and rejected recovery of punitive damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 21 Ledingham concluded that punitive damages were
recoverable where the insurer's conduct included any of the following
elements: (1) falsely accusing the insured of misrepresentation, (2) at-
tempting to settle based on untrue defenses, (3) causing excessive delay,
and (4) engaging in other arguably "outrageous" conduct. 2 7
V. Illinois' Strict Pleading Requirements
Both California and Illinois are "fact pleading" jurisdictions. 2 8 How-
ever, California interprets pleadings much more liberally. Gruenberg v.
Aetna Insurance Co. defined the appellate standard for reviewing a sus-
tained demurrer in California:
[T]he rule is that if, upon consideration of all the facts stated, it appears
that the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court
against the defendants, the complaint will be held good . In other
words, "plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled
to some relief. ' 2' 9
Debolt discussed the Illinois standard:
We are well aware of the fundamental rule that a motion to dismiss
such as we had in the instant case admits all facts well pleaded together
with all reasonable inferences which could be drawn from those facts...
[lit is also well established that a motion to dismiss or strike a pleading
admits facts well pleaded, but not conclusions of fact unsupported by
allegations of specific facts upon which such conclusions rest. 22'
disability insurance policy, maliciously employed by the insurer in concert with false
and threatening communications, for the purpose of causing the insured to surrender
his policy or disadvantageously settle a nonexistent dispute, may legally give rise to
a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress or some other cause
of action sounding in tort.
Id. at 400, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
215. 22 III. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
216. Fletcher rejected the argument accepted in Knierim that "[because] the basis of the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress is outrageous conduct, compensatory damages
assuage the outrage and punitive damages should not be allowed in addition thereto." Fletcher,
10 Cal. App. 3d at 404, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95. Fletcher said such a contention was "not
meritorious." Id. (citing State Rubbish Collectors Assoc. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d
282 (1952)).
217. Ledingham, 29 III. App. 3d at 350-51, 330 N.E.2d at 549.
218. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.10 (West Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-603
(Smith-Hurd 1983).
219. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 572, 510 P.2d 1032, 1036, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480, 484 (1973) (emphasis added).
220. 56 I11. App. 3d at 113, 371 N.E.2d at 375 (citation omitted).
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Out of the thirteen appeals from preliminary pleading stages reviewed for
this article, nine were affirmed at least partially because the facts alleged
were "conclusory."' 2 2
The standard of review stated by the Fourth District Appellate Court
in Perschall v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.22 2 is similar to the Cali-
fornia standard. The court affirmed the trial court's finding of vexatious
and unreasonable conduct by the insurer. "Although we agree that the
question is a close one, we find no justification for reversal. The applicable
standard of review would permit reversal only if we find that the trial
court abused its discretion." '223 However, most Illinois courts do not follow
the standard articulated by the Fourth District.
Urfer v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. 224 followed Ledingham 's reliance
on Fletcher to determine bad faith:
Threatened and actual bad faith refusals to make payments under the
policy, maliciously employed by defendants in concert with false and
threatening communications directed to the policyholder for the pur-
poses of causing him to surrender his policy or disadvantageously settle
a nonexistent dispute, constitutes a tortious interference with a protected
property interest of its insured for which damages may be recovered.22
The Urfer court found that the complaint contained:
no allegations of fact purporting to show willful, vexatious or unrea-
sonable conduct within the context of [Fletcher] . . . It is well established
that an actionable wrong cannot be made out by the vituperous and
profuse interpolation of adjectives characterizing an act as having been
wrongfully done. The pleading of conclusions alone will not suffice for
factual allegations upon which a cause of action must be based.22
221. McCarter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 130 Ill. App. 3d 97, 473 N.E.2d 1015
(3rd Dist. 1985); Kinney v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 120 Ill. App. 3d 294, 458 N.E.2d 79
(Ist Dist. 1983); McCall v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 117 Ill. App. 3d 107, 452 N.E.2d 894
(4th Dist. 1983); Hamilton v. Safeway Ins. Co., 104 Ill. App. 3d 353, 432 N.E.2d 996 (1st
Dist. 1982); Adduci v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 472, 424 N.E.2d 645 (1st Dist. 1981);
Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 85 I1. App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156 (2d Dist. 1980); LaRotunda
v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 446, 408 N.E.2d 928 (Ist Dist. 1980); Edwins v.
General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin, 78 Ill. App. 3d 965, 397 N.E.2d 1231 (4th Dist. 1979); Scroggins
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718 (Ist Dist. 1979); Tobolt v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 75 111. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (1st Dist. 1979); Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co., 56 Ill. App. 3d I1, 371 N.E.2d 373 (3rd Dist. 1978); Urfer v. Country Mut. Ins.
Co., 60 Ill. App. 3d 469, 376 N.E.2d 1073 (4th Dist. 1978). However, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, § 2-603(c) (Smith-Hurd 1983), provides that "pleadings shall be construed with a view to
doing substantial justice between the parties."
222. 113 I1. App. 3d 233, 446 N.E.2d 570 (4th Dist. 1983).
223. Id. at 239, 446 N.E.2d at 574 (citing Deverman v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 56 Ill. App.
3d 122, 371 N.E.2d 1147 (4th Dist. 1977)); Songer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 91 Il. App.
3d 248, 414 N.E.2d 768 (5th Dist. 1980).
224. 60 Ill. App. 3d 469, 376 N.E.2d 1073 (4th Dist. 1978).
225. Id. at 472, 376 N.E.2d at 1075 (quoting Fletcher).
226. Id. at 473, 376 N.E.2d at 1075-76 (quoting Alswang v. Claybon, 40 I1. App. 3d 147,
351 N.E.2d 285 (Ist Dist. 1976)).
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Urfer seems to require conduct substantially the same as the defendant's
conduct in Fletcher. In Urfer, the defendant insurer, Country Mutual,
failed to pay Delmar Urfer's hospital and medical bills and failed to make
income continuation payments.2 27 The third amended complaint did not
seek recovery for breach of contract, but "sounded only in tort for
compensatory and punitive damages alleging a willful refusal to pay.'' 2 8
Urfer claimed that he was obliged to sell portions of his farm business
because of Country Mutual's refusal to pay on the policy.22 9 However,
since the complaint did not allege that Country Mutual had been advised
of the sale, the court found that Urfer failed to allege poverty.230
The court discussed what would constitute a prima facie case for tortious
breach of an insurance contract under Fletcher:
[In Fletcher] a prima facie case for an action in tort arose where the
defendant had numerous medical reports establishing the fact of disa-
bility; a medical report on a surgical fusion of a vertebra with the
medical opinion that it would interfere with employment; defendant
knew that plaintiff was unable to work and its investigative report
showed that plaintiff was impoverished as the result of such denial of
payments while he was unable to work; that defendant misrepresented
the fact as to a pre-existing defect in discontinuing payment and defend-
ant's offer to compromise plaintiff's claim was conditioned upon a
complete release of that claim."'
In Fletcher, the plaintiff was injured at work while lifting a heavy object.
He was surgically treated for a hernia, returned to work, but was eventually
placed on disability for continued problems with his back. There was
"virtually unanimous" agreement that the plaintiff was disabled because
of the back injury. 2 2 Fletcher subsequently was hospitalized for a mye-
logram. His consulting physicians recommended surgical fusion of a spinal
disc. The defendant insurer, Western National, received a letter from one
of the physicians that stated:
I am sure that you are well aware of the fact that Mr. Fletcher has a
large family and if such surgery were performed subsequently his em-
ployment outlook would be very poor to say the least. 2"
227. 60 I1. App. 3d at 470, 376 N.E.2d at 1073. Urfer, who was hit by a school bus,
previously received $50,000 from the school district in a settlement. His first two complaints
were dismissed, because they were based on the defendant's breach of a "no fault" insurance
contract under the Illinois "no fault" insurance statute, which had been held unconstitutional.
60 Il. App. 3d at 470, 376 N.E.2d at 1074.
228. Id. The third amended complaint was mistakenly referred to as the second amended
complaint in the trial court's order of dismissal.
229. Id. at 474, 376 N.E.2d at 1076.
230. Id. The court also noted that the first medical report to establish disability was delivered
to Country Mutual more than three years after the injury. Id.
231. Id.
232. Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 387, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
233. Id. at 387, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
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While Fletcher was not working after the hernia surgery, Western Na-
tional paid him $150.00 per month under the sickness portion of his
disability insurance policy. After being notified of the surgical fusion of
the disc, Western National's claims supervisor elected to treat the claim
under the "sickness" provision of the policy, which exposed the company
to liability for only two years. The "injury" provision would have exposed
the company to liability for thirty years, a difference in exposure of more
than $50,000.00.
Western National refused to make any payment to Fletcher. It accused
Fletcher of misrepresenting his condition by failing to reveal a congenital
condition when he applied for insurance, "[njotwithstanding the complete
absence of any investigation concerning a congenital defect. 23 4 Initially,
Western National demanded that Fletcher pay $2,250.00, less the amount
of his premiums, for benefits received under the policy. Finally, Western
National offered to allow Fletcher to keep the payments already made to
him, in consideration for cancellation of his policy.
Urfer stated that defendant Country Mutual did not act in bad faith
because its conduct was unlike Western National's conduct in Fletcher."5
This emphasis on the malicious conduct in Fletcher should not go to the
plaintiff's ability to state a cause of action. Such ability should be based
on an objective standard of what constitutes a breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing or a violation of the Unfair Practices Act.
The degree of maliciousness goes to whether punitive damages are properly
assessed.
It is peculiar that the Illinois courts rely almost exclusively on the
malicious conduct in Fletcher to determine if a complaint states a cause
of action for bad faith. The more liberal standard adopted by most
California courts is whether or not benefits were unreasonably withheld.
The applicable California standard jury instruction reads:
An insurance company which fails to deal fairly and in good faith with
its insured by refusing unreasonably to pay the insured for a valid claim
covered by the policy is subject to liability for all damages proximately
caused thereby. -,
In Debolt,2 "1 and Tobolt, 3 s two additional Illinois Appellate Courts
relied on Fletcher23 9 to hold that plaintiffs failed to state a sufficient cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Debolt, James
Debolt purchased a disability income policy from Mutual of Omaha.
Debolt injured his back and became totally disabled as defined by his
234. Id. at 389, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
235. Urfer, 60 Il1. App. 3d at 473, 376 N.E.2d at 1075.
236. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL No. 12.92 (6th rev. ed. 1977).
237. 56 Ill. App. 3d 111. 371 N.E.2d 373 (3d Dist. 1978).
238. 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (Ist Dist. 1979).
239. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
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insurance policy. In Count One of his complaint, Debolt alleged that
Mutual of Omaha, cognizant of his physical incapacity and financial
problems, delayed and ultimately ceased payments, and "shuffled" his
claim file between Illinois and its home office in Nebraska. When the
disability benefits were substantially in arrears, Mutual of Omaha offered
to re-purchase the contract of insurance at "an unconscionably low fig-
ure."1 40 In Count Two, Debolt sought $5,000,000 in punitive damages for
Mutual of Omaha's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Count Three sought $250,000.00 in compensatory damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss Counts Two and
Three with prejudice. The Third District Appellate Court affirmed. 24' The
court based its rejection of the action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress on the plaintiff's failure to meet the standard pleading rules:
[W]e find that [plaintiff's complaint] ... is fraught with conclusions
of fact unsupported by allegations of specific facts, i.e., that defendant
instilled in plaintiff a fear for his life and that defendant instituted a
policy designed to coerce the plaintiff into surrendering his policy. 2
The court concluded that the "specific facts" pled by plaintiff were not
enough to show "outrageous conduct" by the insurer.2 43 Debolt relied 244
on the Illinois Supreme Court's refusal to find sufficient facts to state a
cause of action based on far more "abusive conduct" in Public Finance
Corp. v. Davis.241
In Tobolt,2 46 the plaintiffs' home was extensively damaged by fire. The
home was insured for up to $40,000.00 under an Allstate homeowner's
policy. The plaintiffs alleged that Allstate failed to meet its obligation to
pay for repairs to their home, clothing, personal property loss, and ad-
ditional living expenses. They further alleged that Allstate's failure to meet
this obligation caused plaintiffs indigence and great financial distress.
Plaintiffs alleged that Allstate thus left them unable to make a "balloon
note" payment of over $5,000.00 on their home, and compelled them to
borrow money, accept gifts, and seek assistance of the American Red
Cross to pay their bills. They alleged that their credit was damaged, and
that they suffered extreme emotional distress as a result of Allstate's
failure to meet its obligation. 24 7
240. Debolt, 56 Ill. App. 3d at 112, 371 N.E.2d at 375.
241. Id. at 117, 371 N.E.2d at 378. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Count One of the
complaint in order to take the appeal.
242. Id. at 113, 371 N.E.2d at 375.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 114, 371 N.E.2d at 376.
245. 66 Ill. 2d 85, 360 N.E.2d 765 (1976).
246. 75 111. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (Ist Dist. 1979).
247. Id. at 59-60, 393 N.E.2d at 1172-73.
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In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that:
Allstate had notice and knew, or had reason to know full well, that its
deliberate and unwarranted refusal to honor numerous demands during
a time when plaintiffs were in dire need of the insurance proceeds would
be and was in reckless disregard of and harmful to the interest of
plaintiffs.2-
As in Debolt, the Tobolt court relied on Public Finance Corp. v. Davis. 249
The court found that a defendant's conduct must be extreme and outra-
geous; a tortious, criminal, or a malicious intent is not enough. "Liability
has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in char-
acter, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency . "..."250 The emotional distress suffered must be severe, and the
conduct must be conduct from which "the actor knows severe emotional
distress is certain or substantially certain to result." '25 ' The court found
that plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege these elements:
The allegations of count two and the correspondence incorporated in it
show that the only dispute between plaintiffs and Allstate was the
amount of the adjustment and the amount owing them. No facts are
alleged showing Allstate's adjustment of the fire loss constituted out-
rageous conduct by Allstate."'
The "correspondence" discussed the Tobolts' assignment of Worldwide
Public Adjusters to represent their interest in the loss. Worldwide Public
Adjusters had hired its subsidiary, Worldwide Construction Company, to
repair the Tobolts' dwelling. Allstate insisted that any repairs completed
improperly were the responsibility of Worldwide Adjusters and Worldwide
Construction:
In the present case, defendant adjusted the loss based upon its own
investigation and the independent investigation of plaintiffs' public
adjuster. In addition, plaintiffs' complaint contains no allegations of
bad faith "settlement" negotiations or outrageous conversations with
plaintiffs.2"
Both Debolt and Tobolt distinguished Eckenrode v. Life of America
Insurance Co.,2 5" in which a federal district court upheld a plaintiff's cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Eckenrode,
the plaintiff's husband was a homicide victim. The plaintiff met all con-
ditions of her husband's life insurance policy and repeatedly demanded
248. Id. at 60, 393 N.E.2d at 1173.
249. 66 Ill. 2d 85, 360 N.E.2d 765 (1976).
250. Tobolt, 75 III. App. 3d at 63, 393 N.E.2d at 1175 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 comment d (1965).
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS comment i (1965).
252. Tobolt, 75 111. App. 3d at 64, 393 N.E.2d at 1176.
253. Id. at 65, 393 N.E.2d at 1177.
254. 470 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1972).
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payment, but the defendant refused to pay. "Denied payment by insurer,
[plaintiff] was required to borrow money to support her family, while her
financial condition worsened. The family was required to live with, and
accept charity from a relative." 2 " '
The plaintiff alleged that the insurer knew or should have known of her
dire need of the policy proceeds, but that it repeatedly and deliberately
refused her demands for payment. "Insurer, knowing full well that plain-
tiff needed the proceeds of the policy to provide necessaries for her
children, applied 'economic coercion' in refusing to make payment on the
policy, and in 'inviting' plaintiff to 'compromise' her claim by implying
it [insurer] had a valid defense to the claim. '2 6
Tobolt said of Eckenrode:
[Diefendant's refusal to pay accidental death benefits was based on a
bad faith insistence on a non-existent defense. The court held that
refusal to pay, under circumstances where plaintiff's need for the pro-
ceeds was great and defendant's duty to pay was clear, could constitute
extreme and outrageous conduct and entitle plaintiff to recover for
severe emotional distress.2"
Tobolt emphasized that Eckenrode "was careful to point out that 'settle-
ment tactics may be privileged under circumstances where an insurer has
done no more than insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way' . ...
[Firom the correspondence attached to plaintiffs' amended complaint, it
is apparent that Allstate was only 'insisting upon its legal rights in a
permissible way.' ,,,11 However, Tobolt ignored Fletcher's declaration about
an insurer's "privilege" to conduct settlement negotiations:
Undoubtedly an insurance company is privileged, in pursuing its own
economic interests, to assert in a permissible way its legal rights and to
communicate its position in good faith to its insured even though it is
substantially certain that in so doing emotional distress will be caused.
The social utility served by recognition of this privilege is obviously
enhanced when the privilege is exercised in connection with settlement
negotiations, which are certainly to be encouraged.
Nevertheless, the exercise of the privilege to assert one's legal rights
must be done in a permissible way and with a good faith belief in the
existence of the rights asserted ... Even if it could be said that defend-
ants were asserting their legal rights in good faith, they were not
privileged to do so in an outrageous manner ... Settlement implies the
existence of a good faith dispute, and there is no public policy in favor
of an attempt to coerce settlement of a nonexistent dispute by outrageous
means.211
255. Id. at 2.
256. Id.
257. Tobolt, 75 I1. App. 3d at 66, 393 N.E.2d at 1177.
258. Id.
259. Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 395-96, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (citations omitted).
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C. Relaxed Pleading Requirements for Emotional Distress
Tobolt distinguished the California case of Crisci v. Security Insurance
Co. of New Haven, Conn. 260 The Tobolt court held that:
[wihere other interests have been involved, mental distress may be an
element of damages not requiring "outrageous" conduct or "severe"
mental distress, but that where the claim is for the independent tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress that conduct must be "out-
rageous" and the emotional distress "severe." In Crisci, other interests
were invaded.2 6'
However, Crisci is indistinguishable: both Debolt and Tobolt sued not
only for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but also for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Under Fletcher,
this breach would constitute interference with a protected property interest,
and all damages proximately flowing from the breach, including emotional
distress, would be recoverable.
Tobolt and Debolt did not mention Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,2 62
another California case, which held that plaintiffs could recover damages
for mental distress incurred in connection with other injuries. Jerome
Gruenberg owned a restaurant that was insured against fire loss by the
three defendant insurers. Gruenberg was charged with arson after the
restaurant burned down. A claims adjuster for an independent adjusting
agency testified at the preliminary hearing that Gruenberg had excessive
fire insurance coverage. The magistrate eventually dismissed the charges
for lack of probable cause. During the pendency of the criminal proceed-
ings, defendants requested that Gruenberg submit'to an exam under oath
in compliance with his policy provisions. Gruenberg refused to submit to
the exam while the criminal charges were pending. After the charges were
dismissed, Gruenberg's attorney advised defendants that he would submit
to an examination.
The insurers denied liability based on Gruenberg's failure to appear for
the exam. The court held that Gruenberg could recover for emotional
distress although he failed to allege that defendants' conduct was extreme
and outrageous. Gruenberg did not sue for the independent tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress; he sued for mental distress associ-
ated with his failure to obtain benefits under his insurance policy. The
California Supreme Court cited Crisci, in which it upheld recovery for
"mental suffering." The court stated, "We are satisfied that a plaintiff
who as a result of a defendant's tortious conduct loses his property and
suffers mental distress may recover not only pecuniary loss but also for
his mental distress. ' 26 3
260. 66 Cal. 2d 245, 426 P.2d 1032, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1973).
261. 75 Ill. App. 3d at 66, 393 N.E.2d at 1177.
262. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
263. Id. at 579, 510 P.2d at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489 (citing Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 433-34,
426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19) (emphasis added by Gruenberg court).
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The court distinguished the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 46,264
which applies only "to the independent tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. ' 265 The court relied on comment (b) to that section,
which discusses emotional distress as an element of damages where other
interests have been invaded. "[lI]n the instant case we are concerned with
mental distress resulting from a substantial invasion of property interests
of the insured and not with the independent tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress .... ",266 Gruenberg also distinguished Fletcher, since
the theory of recovery in Fletcher was "predicated on the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress alone, 2 67 as opposed to Gruenberg, in
which "recovery is sought on a totally distinct theory. "268
The only Illinois appellate court case to hold that a plaintiff's claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress was sufficient is Robertson v.
Travelers Insurance Co. 269 In Robertson, the Fifth District Appellate Court
held that an employee stated a sufficient cause of action for "outrage"
against his employer's workers compensation insurer.27 0 Robertson slipped
and fell while employed as a carpenter. Travelers Insurance Company was
his employer's workers compensation insurer. Robertson was required to
file his claim for workers compensation no later than one year after the
date upon which he last received direct benefits, which would have been
March 30, 1973.27 1 A Travelers claims representative interviewed Robertson
on March 26, but did not remind him of the running of the limitations
period. On March 29, Travelers wrote Robertson a letter denying his
claim. Robertson received the letter on April 2. A memo written by a
claims representative stated: "On 4-3-73, this writer discussed the above
case with supervisor Balsiger and claims attorney Knobbe and both of
these individuals agree with this writer that the statute of limitations has
expired . . .The Travelers Insurance Company should be 'home free'. 272
Robertson filed a workers compensation claim on April 2, 1973. The
Supreme Court of Illinois held that Travelers was estopped from asserting
the statute of limitations as a defense. During the pendency of the suit,
plaintiff was recovering from surgery and could not work:
He was forced to borrow from relatives, go on public aid, and accept
charity from the volunteer fire department of which he was a long-
264. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
265. Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 580, 510 P.2d at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 580, 510 P.2d at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
268. Id.
269. 100 III. App. 3d 845, 427 N.E.2d 302 (5th Dist. 1981) (same court that decided
Ledingham).
270. Id. at 855, 427 N.E.2d at 312.
271. Id. at 846, 427 N.E.2d at 305 (the insurer was under the impression that the statute of
limitations ran on March 27, 1973).
272. Id. at 848, 427 N.E.2d at 306.
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standing member, in order to provide for his family. This financial
strain upset the plaintiff and caused him to become, in his own words,
"highly nervous and forgetful." '
The court held that these facts were sufficient to allege the tort of
"outrage." The court cited its own decision in Ledingham, holding that
an insurer could be sued under either of two tort theories: intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and interference with a protected property
interest for an insurer's threatened or actual bad faith refusal to pay
benefits under a policy.
The court approved Debolt 74 as properly affirming the dismissal of a
complaint that "failed to allege specific facts which could be interpreted
as outrageous conduct by the defendant." '275 The court also agreed with
Tobolt's holding that Allstate had only differed with its insured on the
amount of the loss and had insisted upon its legal rights in a permissible
way.
The court favorably compared the facts of Robertson's claim with
Eckenrode v. Life of America Insurance Co.2 76 The court found that the
conduct of Travelers Insurance Company was:
[at] least as outrageous as the conduct held actionable by the Seventh
Circuit. In some respects, the deviousness of Travelers' employees ren-
ders their action even more reprehensible. Furthermore, the plaintiff
here suffered injury comparable to that suffered by Mrs. Eckenrode
... All of these facts, alleged by the plaintiff, show conduct signifi-
cantly more outrageous than that in Ledingham, Debolt, and Tobolt.
This complaint resembles that in Eckenrode, and thus states a cause of
action in outrage under Illinois law. 2"
D. California Cases
California courts base their decisions on the common law principle278
found in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,179 and Communale v. Traders
& General Insurance Co. 280 In every insurance contract there is an implied
273. Id.
274. 56 Ill. App. 3d I1, 371 N.E.2d 373 (Ist Dist. 1978).
275. Robertson, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 851-52, 427 N.E.2d at 308. The court did not discuss
Debolt's holding regarding the preemption of § 767. See also Mattis, Punitive and Compensatory
Damages in Illinois Insurance Cases: Some Constitutional Questions, 73 ILL. B.J. 206, 210
(1984).
276. 470 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1972).
277. Robertson, 100 111. App. 3d at 853, 427 N.E.2d at 309. The court remanded the case
for a new trial on the issue of damages, ruling that the trial court had erred in allowing punitive
damages against the defendant.
278. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d at 572-73, 510 P.2d at 1036, 108 Cal. Rptr.
at 484-85 (1973).
279. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
280. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It is the obligation, deemed to
be imposed by the law, under which the insurer must act fairly and in
good faith in discharging its contractual duties. When the insurer fails to
deal fairly and in good faith with its insured by refusing, without proper
cause, to compensate for a loss covered by the policy, such conduct may
give rise to a cause of action in tort for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.1
8 1
California courts do not distinguish between the duty owed to the insured
to settle his own claim or to settle a third-party claim against the insured: '82
[ln Communale and Crisci we made it clear that [liability is imposed
on the insurer] not for a bad faith breach of contract but for failure to
meet the duty to accept reasonable settlements, a duty included within
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing .... In those two
cases, we considered the duty of the insurer to act in good faith and
fairly in handling the claims of third persons against the insured,
described as a "duty to accept reasonable settlements"; in the case
before us we consider the duty of an insurer to act in good faith and
fairly in handling the claim of an insured, namely a duty not to withhold
unreasonably payments due under a policy. These are merely two dif-
ferent aspects of the same duty.2-
California courts have also held that "the insurer's duty is unconditional
and independent of the performance of plaintiff's contractual obliga-
tions. ''284
Fletcher listed the elements of a prima facie case for the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress:
(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant;
(2) the defendant's intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the
probability of causing, emotional distress;
(3) the plaintiff suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and
(4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the
defendant's outrageous conduct.211
The Fletcher court held that the defendant's conduct met these require-
ments:
Viewed most favorably to plaintiff, the foregoing facts and inferences
to be drawn therefrom established that defendants, without probable
281. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d at 575, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at
485 (emphasis added).
282. The Illinois appellate courts have made this distinction in determining that § 767 preempts
claims by the insured against his own insurer, but not third-party "duty to settle" cases. See
supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
283. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Ca. 3d at 573, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
284. Id. at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488 (plaintiff's alleged breach of policy
conditions by refusing to submit to an examination under oath did not excuse defendants from
their duty of good faith and fair dealing).
285. Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 394, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
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cause for believing that plaintiff had made an intentional material
misrepresentation or that his disability was due to anything other than
his injury in January 1965, embarked upon a concerted course of
conduct to induce plaintiff to surrender his insurance policy or enter
into a disadvantageous "settlement" of a nonexistent dispute by means
of false and threatening letters and the employment of economic pressure
based upon his disabled and, therefore impecunious, condition (the very
thing insured against) exacerbated by Western National's malicious and
bad faith refusal to pay plaintiff's legitimate claim. Defendants concede
that their conduct was deplorable and outrageous.28 '
The Fletcher court then discussed "severe" emotional distress:
It is for the court to determine whether, on the evidence, severe
emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to determine whether,
on the evidence, it has in fact existed. It is our conclusion that there is
sufficient evidence from which emotional distress of the requisite severity
can be found and that there is substantial evidence to support the jury's
determination that it in fact existed ....
It is true that plaintiff's testimony did not indicate that he suffered any
traumatic emotional distress of the character of shock, horror or nausea,
but the requisite emotional distress may consist of any highly unpleasant
mental reaction such as fright, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrass-
ment, anger, chagrin, disappointment or worry . . . Susceptibility of the
plaintiff to emotional distress and a defendant's awareness thereof, have
often been mentioned as significant in determining liability. "7
The court also noted that the duration of the emotional distress is a factor
to be considered in determining its severity. Although a number of "woeful
occurrences' 28 had befallen the plaintiff, a substantial part of plaintiff's
emotional distress was a result of the "threatened and actual discontinu-
ance of payments by defendants and the resulting economic conse-
quences. ' "89
The court allowed punitive damages because plaintiff's case sounded in
tort, not in contract. The court rejected defendant's contention that section
10111 of the California Insurance Code bars punitive damages. 290
Instead of following the California approach to bad faith actions, Illinois
courts have tended to cite only those aspects of California cases which
bolster their own very different analysis. By using only pieces of the larger
California framework, the different Illinois districts have become divisive
286. Id. at 392, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
287. Id. at 397-98, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 99 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46,
comment j (1965)).
288. Id. at 398, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
289. Id. at 399, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
290. The California Insurance Code provides: "In life or disability insurance, the only
measure of liability and damage is the sum or sums payable in the manner and at the times as
provided in the policy to the person entitled thereto." CAL. INS. CODE § 101iI (West 1972).
No California court has held that this section prohibits private causes of action or limits damage
awards.
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in their fragmented approach to insurance law.29' Still, this fragmentation
291. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois followed this
pattern in Langendorf v. Travelers State Ins. Co., 625 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Ill. 1985). In
Langendorf, the district court granted defendant Travelers' motion to dismiss Count V of the
plaintiffs' complaint, which the court interpreted as a claim for consequential damages resulting
from Travelers' breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Langendorf
court recognized that "[the Illinois appellate] courts have not been particularly clear about
what is required to state a claim for the breach of the duty of good faith dealing." Id. at 1108.
However, it ignored this acknowledgment and narrowly defined the two elements necessary to
plead such a claim, relying on another federal district court case, Barr v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
America, 583 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ill. 1984), and on the very- strict holding of the Fourth
District Appellate Court in Urfer v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 376 N.E.2d 1073 (1978).
The Langendorf court held that the plaintiffs failed to plead two necessary elements: (I)
that "the insurer must have known it was liable on the contract but nonetheless refused to
pay"; and (2) that "the insurer must also know that if it did not pay on its policy, substantial
damage and injury would likely befall the insured." Id. at 1108-09. In Langendorf, the plaintiffs
alleged that plaintiff Sheri Langendorf was hospitalized due to severe complications after giving
birth, and incurred approximately $115,000 in medical bills. Although the Langendorfs' group
insurance policy provided for "unlimited medical and hospital care benefits," Travelers claimed
there was a $50,000 limit on the benefits payable, and refused to pay any amount over the
$50,000 limit. Id. at 1104. Even though these facts were alleged, the court dismissed a
construction of Count V of the complaint for consequential damages caused by Travelers'
breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, finding that the plaintiffs failed to
allege facts meeting the court's self-initiated determination of very strict requirements of a bad
faith cause of action.
The court also found that Count V could not be interpreted as a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, following the reasoning of Anderson v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co., 594 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ill. 1984), in which the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois held that § 767 preempts a claim under that theory for an insurer's outrageous
delay in settling a claim.
The court did uphold one narrow interpretation of Count V: it held that a claim for the
"contract-based consequential injury of emotional distress" had been "well pled" by the
plaintiffs, but it did not rule on the issue of whether such consequential injuries are compensable
in a claim for breach of insurance contract because the parties had not addressed that issue on
appeal. The court strongly implied that such a claim would be dismissed once it had been
properly addressed. Id. at 1106.
The court also dismissed the construction of Count VI of the plaintiffs' complaint as a
claim for consequential damages for Travelers' breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. The court again found that the plaintiffs had failed to plead the two necessary elements
to overcome dismissal. It interpreted Count VI as a claim for another consequential damage
resulting from the alleged breach of contract, but refused to rule on whether such damages are
recoverable. Id. at 1109.
This decision is one more example of the Illinois courts' insistence on dismissing actions
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing at the pleading stage, without
giving the plaintiffs the opportunity to be heard on the merits. This unwillingness to address
bad faith issues head-on has apparently infected the federal courts located in Illinois as well.
The federal court in Langendorf failed to follow its own statement of its duty that "when
the highest state court has not yet spoken on an issue, a federal district court is obligated to
predict what that court would do if presented with the issue." Id. at 1105. Instead of examining
what the Illinois Supreme Court would do when confronted with the conflicting appellate court
decisions, Langendorf capriciously chose the strictest requirements it could for pleading the
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seems to be overridden by an almost universal reluctance to find adequately
stated causes of action, unless unusually strict pleading requirements are
met. Although some districts have theoretically approved bad faith actions,
such requirements have made actions difficult to maintain and large
damage awards a virtual impossibility.
CONCLUSION
Illinois needs to clarify the interpretation of Insurance Code section 767.
As currently applied by intermediate appellate courts, section 767 need-
lessly limits compensatory damages and emasculates Insurance Code sec-
tion 766.6. Conflicting decisions of the various appellate districts can be
resolved by looking to history, public policy, and the laws of other
jurisdictions. Specifically, section 767 should not preempt common law
remedies. The attorney fees provision adds an element of compensatory
damages not ordinarily available in a contract setting. The availability of
an additional compensatory remedy does not affect the general practices
of insurance companies. Punitive damages have a therapeutic effect on
the type of conduct prohibited by the statute. Punitive damages have
traditionally been available for malice, oppression and fraud and can be
adequately controlled by judges at both the trial and appellate levels.
Illinois should and can make its Unfair Practices Act protect against
predatory practices.
tort of bad faith.
The Langendorf court also found that no private cause of action could be brought under §
766.6 of the Illinois Insurance Code, following the consensus of the appellate courts. For a
further discussion of this, see text accompanying footnotes 64-112.
